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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The 1980's marked an exhilarating and yet trying time for Brazil and Argentina. In
Brazil, government was formally turned over to civilian president Jose Sarney in 1985 after
twenty-one years of bureaucratic-authoritarian military rule. Two years earlier, Argentina
experienced liberation from its notoriously oppressive military regime known as the
Proceso de Reorganization National (simply Proceso) which had controlled every facet of
Aigentine existence since 1976. Both nations still harbored bitter memories from human
and civil rights abuses committed during those administrations; Argentina much more so
with estimates of civilians murdered by the government ranging anywhere from 6,000 to
30,000 while in Brazil the numbers approximated 300.
The re-emergence of civilian rule in both Brazil and Argentina brought new hope
for those outside the military that they could once again determine their own future.
Nevertheless, the armed forces, traditionally powerful, remained a viable entity within the
socio-political framework of both nations and, thus, needed to be addressed. This thesis
examines the evolution of that civil-military dynamic during the 1990's. With the multiple
global transformations experienced since the end of the Cold War including the ubiquitous
rise of trade blocs, the world today is very different from that of the 1980's. This
metamorfosis has, in many respects, greatly influenced South American civil-military
relations. Cognizant of that change, my work seeks to update the civil-military discussion
by answering the following central questions:
1 . Is the military still a political actor?
2 . Are civilian institutions sufficiently strong to counter armed forces involvement?
3 . What is the effect of economic globalization and neo-liberalism on the civil-
military dynamic?
4. Are remnants of authoritarianism still prevalent?
5 . What is the likelihood of another military government?
6. Do civilian leaders interpret democracy and effective policy results as an "either
or" situation or can the two concepts co-exist?
7 . What do the above answers foretell for the future of democracy in Brazil and
Argentina?
8. Can any one model accurately explain contemporary civil-military relations?
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"If you do not know where you came from; how will you know where you are
going? Reflective of the wisdom of this Hispanic quote, I begin this thesis with an
examination of the civil-military literature and history from the colonial period to the
present. Writing chronologically, I attempt to demonstrate how the Brazilian and Argentine
military officer s psyche evolved from his early days as a representative of the king's
authority to the latter twentieth-century as a national governor. In so doing, I hope to shed
light on, not only what bureucratic-authoritarianism was, but also how and why it emerged
in South America. Finally, I close this historical chapter by introducing the various schools
of thought on contemporary civil-military relations; a discussion to which greater depth will
be afforded in chapters three and four.
Chapter three analyzes Brazil, the largest of all Latin American nations. There the
armed forces emerged from government as a relatively cohesive body (in comparison to
Argentina). During the first five years after the official transition, that military unity, along
with an indirectly elected civilian president, perpetuated a tutelary model of civil-military
relations. However, with the dawn of the post-Cold War era and the first direct
presidential election in three decades in 1989, Brazilian civil-military relations became much
more ambiguous. Some scholars have claimed that the military is no longer a political
factor in that Portuguese-speaking nation. 1 However, economic and political events have
challenged that assertion. I argue that the Brazilian armed forces, which still enjoy a
considerable degree of public sympathy, remain an important political actor, yet as an
interest group. Traditional national security/guardian themes have been abandoned in their
political discourse and replaced by union-like demands for salary increases, benefits, etc.
which have been addressed by the civilian sphere through extensive bargaining. This is,
however, not to say that the military cannot still be a vehicle of political intimidation. The
key discerning feature between this threat and that of its past, is that with the emergence of
a new world order, the threat has been harnessed and manipulated to a considerable extent
by the president. Nevertheless, this relationship still highlights the challenges inherent in
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Brazil s democratic consolidation. Without the strengthening of its institutions, Brazil may
never rid itself of the necessity to negotiate with the military.
Chapter four delves into the turbulent post-Authoritarian Argentine experience. In
that country a discredited armed forces emerged from the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands war in
utter shame. The war focused world attention on the military's incompetence and on its
reputation for brutal internal repression. The Argentine armed forces quickly became a
domestic and international pariah. Internal military factions, which had developed
concerning the direction of national government, became even more polarized as a result of
the events of the early 1980's. The Argentine "transition by collapse" was a clear product
of that self-destruction. Unlike frustrated Brazilians, Argentine civilians were too enraged
by the Pi oceso to settle for indirect elections while the military was too weak to contest that
pent-up demand. The first post-authoritarian president, Raul Alfonsfn, felt he had a
popular mandate for pursuing democracy, with no need to bargain with the broken armed
forces. Unfortunately, his passion for the respect of democratic institutions came at a
sacrifice of decisive leadership. He allowed the quest for civilian retribution to determine
the course of his presidency. A society bent on justice, and in many cases, vengeance
pursued the military establishment into a corner. However, as Deborah Norden has noted:
"A slightly weakened group [military] which is adamantly opposed to the existing political
system poses a greater threat to that system than a somewhat stronger group which has
been incorporated into it." 2 Fighting for its existence, the military recomposed itself and
eventually forced the civilian president to negotiate.
Carlos Saul Menem, Alfonsfn's successor, had learned much from the first post-
Proceso president. He interpreted Alfonsfn's weakness as a product of inflexibility.
Alfonsfn had adhered too faithfully to democratic principles that ultimately proved his
downfall. Menem viewed basic tenets of liberal democracy such as the separation of
powers only useful if they moved the nation forward. Progress is what Argentina needed,
not necessarily democracy. That understanding would be key to explaining Menem's
3
relations with the military which have perpetuated a bargaining function. However, unlike
Brazil, those negotiations have not been due to institutional weakness, rather to an attempt
by Menem to centralize and monopolize power in the executive
The future of democracy in Brazil and Argentina is addressed in the epilogue. Can
these two nations, with long histories of regional and national authoritarianism, forge a
lasting democratic course? Are democratic civil-military relations governmental priorities?
Can democracy co-exist with authoritarianism? These are all challenging questions for
which I offer a number of equally challenging and complex answers. My responses are not
meant to be ultimate conclusions, but merely a departure point for future scholarly debate.
'See Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarian Brazil"
Comparative Politics (July 1995): pp.425-443. See also Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization:
Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36 1
(Spring 1994): pp.37-74.
"Deborah Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism: Argentina in the 1980's "
Journal ofInteramerican Studies 32.3 (Fall 1990): pp. 151 -176.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The military in Latin America has long been an important actor in the region's
development and politics. In many respects, it has written much of Latin American history.
With the transplantation of the Spanish and Portuguese corporate system to the "New
Woild in the late 1400's and early 1500's, the military occupied one of three essential
spheres of preeminence along with the Church and the Elite. That spatialization orfuero
militar allowed the colonial army to become an "independent organism.
..that acted as a
'self-governing' institution that was answerable only to itself." 1 That autonomy, initially
warranted within the context of unestablished centralized states (as was the case in Latin
America up to the 19th century), would become a heavy burden once independence was
established and a formal state emerged.
In South America, as discernible states began to coalesce, armies that had defined
and protected tenuous borders and nascent concepts of sovereignty to allow for the creation
of the state, became increasingly institutionalized. However, Alain Rouquie, in The
Military and the State in Latin America
,
noted that for Central American and Caribbean
armed forces such an evolution was hampered by a variety of domestic and international
factors. Rouquie explained this distinction, writing:
For one, the needs of the economy seem to have been decisive in determining the
degree to which the skeleton of a state apparatus emerged. The growth of
externally oriented social forces integrated into the world market at the end of the
[19th] century presupposed political and social stability. ...The need for
socioeconomic organization, for the establishment of an infrastructure, and for the
expansion of services and of the public administration combined to build the state.
On the other hand, in the nations that did not succeed in integrating themselves into
international trade at this period, and therefore lacked export products that would
permit the rise of a strong bourgeoisie and the appearance of an established social
power, the crystallization of the state was slow in coming. In such nations civil
convulsions were more prolonged and a national army never developed beyond the
stage of a private garrison with a state facade. 2
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The geographic and economic challenges faced by Central America and the Caribbean,
along with the ever-present influence of the United States and a Hispanic tradition of
personalistic politics maintained a praetorian guard mentality within the militaries (or
national guards) of such nations as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Honduras.
These factors helped guarantee the tenure of such memorable leaders/tyrants as Somoza and
Trujillo who ruled with little fidelity to any concept of the "state good."
Graced by greater resources, territory, and population, the nations of South
America were favored with a superior potential for development. They, in essence,
appeared to have a "greater calling." This sense of national destiny, besides bolstering the
growth of the state in the twentieth-century, contributed to the political outlook of the
region's militaries. As their states became increasingly consolidated, the South American
armed foices gained greater institutional cohesiveness. This new cohesiveness, sown in
the fertile ground of the military's Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy dating back to the
fueros, soon blossomed into a distinctive nationalistic military ethos. South American
militaries interpreted their strong sense of order and loyalty as the embodiment of the
highest virtues of their emergent national societies. Military researcher Frederick Nunn, in
The Time of the Generals, wrote that the military, particularly in the chaotic political and
economic environment of Latin America, saw itself as "the purest image of society ." 3 Yet,
at the same time the military also maintained a considerable degree of alienation from the
civil society from which the members of its corps were drawn. In the armed forces'
interpretation of global hierarchy, soldiers ranked above civilians, with the abstract state as
supreme.
The importance of the state to an organized national military is obvious. The state
represents the reason for its existence. Thus, the armed forces have as their fundamental
mission the preservation of that entity; better known as national defense. However, what
the term "national defense" signifies in practice is not necessarily uniform worldwide. In
the United States, the military is generally looked upon as the protector of U.S. interests
6
abroad and the defender against foreign attack with few instances of domestic involvement.
The South American armed forces definition of "national defense" prevalent for most of
this century, however, reflected the region's Iberian roots. The militaries of such nations
as Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Peru understood their mission to be not only the protection
of the state against foreign incursion but also the preservation of a certain standard of moral
and/or political conduct upon the state. This broad guardian/arbiter role was concisely
explained by Argentine Major Venancio Carullo when he stated: "the fatherland looks upon
the army as its sons, in whom it has placed its honor, its integrity, and its life."4
Chile in 1973 offered a vivid example of the ambiguous link between the state's
"honor" and its "life." That year the Chilean military viewed democratically-elected
President Allende's socialist reforms as "dishonorable." Thus, it felt justified in making
the theoretical leap to interpreting those reforms as a threat to the state therefore allowing it
to overthrow the civil government. Rouquie explains this logic by noting that, "the
apparent desire of the military to flee the state from civil society allows the armed forces to
accomplish the goals of the state even against its will and acting in its defense." 5 The
Allende episode, as well as the military overthrows of governments in other South
American nations this century, highlight the armed forces' perception of the state as a
permanent entity with an immutable code of conduct contrasted with the transitory, and
many times less than ethical, nature of elected governments. This desire to "free the state"
from the "threat" of its own government, in the form of a coup d'etat, became so common
an occurrence in twentieth-century Latin America that Howard Wiarda, in 1978, concluded
that it "could be considered. ..a 'normal,' or 'regular' part of the political process...." 6 The
dilemma for civilian citizens and politicians was that the allegedly immutable code of state
conduct appeared, in many instances, to be an arbitrarily interpretable concept created by
the armed forces. Often it was difficult to discern between the military's own institutional
demands and the "state good."
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Samuel Huntington, in his 1957 The Soldier and the State, proposed a solution to
the problem of military coups. Huntington suggested that greater professionalism, in the
form of stronger military instruction, would neutralize the military's political tendencies.
He wrote: Only if they [military] are motivated by military ideals, will the armed forces be
the obedient servant of the state and will civilian control be assured." 7 However, in Brazil
and Argentina, where the military was in many respects the most technologically advanced
and cohesive social entity, this move to greater professionalization had a contradictory
effect. Samuel Fitch, in Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies: Context,
Ideology, and Doctrine in Argentina and Ecuador," concluded that unlike Huntington's
intended end, "[military role beliefs legitimizing the military's tutelary role [were]
reproduced and generationally transmitted through the military school system." 8 The armed
forces, thus, became even more isolated from civil society and more critical of civilian
politics. They viewed "civil society as a divided world, dominated by self-interest and
disorder, and lacking in shared values." 9
With the Cold War rise of the National Security Doctrine the military's alienation
from civilian society was only exacerbated. Alfred Stepan, in Rethinking Military Politics :
Brazil and the Southern Cone, notes:
...where the military was highly institutionalized, the perception of the threat to the
internal security of the nation and the security of the military itself led to a focusing
of energies on the 'professionalization' of their approach to internal security. The
military institutions began to study such questions as the social and political
condition facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and to develop doctrines
and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgency movements. As a result,
these highly professionalized armies became much more concerned with political
problems.
As a result of that concern, the militaries of Brazil and Argentina during the latter half of the
twentieth century assumed an "integrated" professionalism." Under this conception: "the
armed forces saw military control of the government as a necessary step in nation-building
and modernization." 12
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In his 1973 book Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Guillermo
O Donnell outlined how the military's nation-building philosophy became a political reality.
O’Donnell noted that in the 1960's & 1970's populist pressures on the economic systems
of more modernized states, such as Argentina and Brazil, outpaced actual economic
growth. This phenomenon created a threat, be it actual or perceived, to the "propertied
classes" that the entire economic/political system was in jeopardy. That fear, combined
with U.S.-led anti-subversive military training, O'Donnell argued, led the military to
intervene in those two nations. These coups (Argentina: 1966 & 1976; Brazil: 1964) were
distinct from those of the past. They represented the logical extrapolation of the military's
philosophy of the state's preeminence and of the military's own inherent superiority over
the civilian sphere. Under Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (BA), the military restrained
popular demands, but unlike previous transitional coups, the BA armed forces decided that
they were better equipped than any civilian to govern in the long-term. The result of such a
perception was the twenty-one year military government in Brazil and the infamous seven
year Proceso in Argentina.
The emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism was testament to the fact that, as
Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, in The Politics ofAntipolitics: The Military in Latin
America point out, Latin American militaries thrived off an, ironically, very political notion
of being "anti-political." Only the armed forces felt capable of filtering the many layers of
political discourse in the best interest of the country. Loveman and Davies described the
military mentality, writing:
'Politics,' including the demagogic appeals by civilian politcians to the emerging
proletariat, promoted class conflict and instability which 'forced' sectors of the
military to intervene to restore order and cleanse the body politic of political
corruption. 13
Fitch elaborates: "In Latin America.. .the conceptual language of national security and
strategy is typically infused with an organic, corporatist view of society and politics which
implicitly denigrates democratic politics and civilian politicians."
14
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The bureaucratic-authoritarian phenomenon was soon doomed to failure. A heavy
reliance on loosely-monitored technocrats assigned the mission of "nation-building"
quickly led to the accumulation of massive foreign debt. This problem, in addition to the
multiple pressures of daily government, factionalized the armed forces primarily between
those officers who wanted to leave power and those who refused to "surrender."
Sensing their institution threatened by its political role, strong elements within the
Brazilian officer corps began the process of extricating the military from government in the
mid 1970 s. This gradual return to civilian rule, known as abertura or opening, allowed
the Brazilian military to dictate the speed and depth of the transition. The Argentine armed
forces, on the other hand, chose to purge their internal rifts by fire in the hopelessly
miscalculated war with England over the Malvinas/Falklands islands. Argentina's
humiliating loss in that endeavor ultimately resulted in a government transition by collapse.
A new civilian regime, it was commonly felt, symbolized a fresh beginning for both
Argentina and Brazil. This new genesis appeared an ideal time to restructure historical
civil-military patterns of interaction. The traditional poder moderador (arbiter) military,
with its twentieth-century bureaucratic-authoritarian mutation, had proven life-threatening
to the very concept of the state that the armed forces allegedly had tried to protect. Thus,
many scholars looked to the United States as the paradigm for democratic civil-military
relations. The United States military embodied the democratic professionalist model:
obedience to both democracy and civilian authority. However, skepticism remained as to
the feasibility of that model within the new Latin American civilian regimes. Both
Argentina and Brazil were still burdened by their historical corporatist baggage of allotting
the armed forces a distinct social sphere; which traditionally had been accompanied by
political power. Moreover, doubts as to the "reality" of the military's departure from
power were reinforced within the first few years of post-authoritarian life, in both nations,
with numerous military demands being met by civilians. Such occurrences, at the very
least, implied a military framework of "conditional subordination." In this case, the armed
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forces would respect civilian authority until they deemed that authority overridden by their
paiticular interpretation of the national interest; a shaky foundation upon which to re-build
civilian government
.
15
The uncertainties demonstrated by civilian leaders as they attempted to determine
which type of military they were confronting led Brazilian social scientist Jorge Zaverucha,
in Rumor de Sabres
,
to argue that Brazil primarily, and Argentina to a much lesser extent,
remained tutelary democracies. Under that model, the military remained a powerful
actor, a type of guardian over the system from whom civilians required approval in issues
relating to the military and to "national security broadly defined ." 16 The tutelary model also
maintained the potential for renewed direct military intervention in the form of a coup. This
conception was steeped in the understanding that, "[t]he return of civilians to government is
not automatically equivalent to the 'civilianization of power,' even after free and fair
elections ." 17
With the passing of time, other theorists, such as Wendy Hunter, have suggested
that the military in a nation such as Brazil has been politically neutralized by the natural
evolution of electoral politics . 18 In this theory, the civilian vote and related constituency
patronage determine political reality. Hunter argues that the rational-choice dynamic on the
part of elected politicians to be re-elected (specifically legislators) strongly discourages
appeasement to military. Yet her analysis, more importantly than its definition of civil-
military relations, highlights severe weaknesses in Brazilian democratic institutions. That
fragility places into question the future of democracy and thus the potential of ever attaining
truly democratic civil-military relations.
In the Argentine case, while contemporary mainstream opinion rarely considers the
military a threat, scholars such as Atilio Boron and Patrice McSherry have inverted the
civil-military equation to examine the potential for authoritarianism via the armed forces
under civilian leadership. McSherry's analysis of Carlos Saul Menem's presidency will
demonstrate that the military remains an instrument of internal political power. Moreover,
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while the trend in other countries of Latin America seems to bode negatively for the
perpetuation of traditional military prerogatives, Argentina appears to be following a
reverse path. President Alfonsm's initial alienation from the military has been replaced by
President Menem s accomodation and praise. Menem has gone so far as to reinstitute
military privileges that were revoked in the early to mid 1980's, placing in jeopardy the
notion that authoritarianism is merely a memory.
This analysis of the civil-military relations of Argentina and Brazil, like much of
Latin Americanist social science, alludes to the difficulty of imposing any one particular
model as the explanation. Latin America, experiencing extreme cycles of prosperity,
bankruptcy, authoritarianism, and experiments with democracy, has historically presented a
highly convoluted picture. This ambiguity, in terms of contemporary civil-military
relations, has been exacerbated by the worldwide uncertainty of the post-Cold War period.
Thus, any one model may be inappropriate. Instead, it appears that the nations of Latin
America, particularly for the purposes of this study Brazil and Argentina, have adopted
excerpts of many different theories and, in effect, have created their own reality.
This comparative study will demonstrate that the military remains a political actor
for much the same reason in both nations: Civilian government's need for policy results.
To fulfill that need, civilian leaders appear content to bargain with the armed forces. This
relationship, comfortable as it may seem now, presents a puzzling picture for the future of
civilian government, of the military and of the very concept of democracy.
'Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1987), p.45.
2 Rouquie, p.61.
3 Frederick Nunn
,
The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 1 1 8.
4Nunn, p. 1 26.
s
Rouquie, p.43.
6Howard Wiarda, "Critical Elections and Critical Coups: State, Society and the Military in the Processes of
12
atin American Development (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978V
p.43, based on data in Warren Dean, "Latin American Golpes and Economic Fluctuations, 1823-1966,"
ocicil Science Quarterly (June 1970): 70-80. Wiarda cited in Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups andMilitary Rule in Latin America," Armed Forces and Society 20.3 (Spring 1994): pp.439-456
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 74
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. Samuel Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies: Context, Ideology and Doctrine
in Argentina and Ecuador," Paper presented at the XIX Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association
Washington, D.C.; Sept. 28-30, 1995, p. 13.
9
Sili° Waisbord, "Politics and Identity in the Argentine Army: Cleavages and the Generational Factor
"
Latin American Research Review 26.2 (1991): p.161.
10
Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Abraham
Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holmes and Meier
1986), p. 1 37.
"Robert A. Potash, "The Impact of Professionalism on the Twentieth Century Argentine Military,"
Program in Latin American Studies Occasional Papers, 3rd Series (Amherst: University of Massachusetts,
1977) as cited in Paul Zagorski, " Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces
under the Menem Government," Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1994): p.424.
l2
Zagorski, p.424.
13
Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, eds. The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military’ in Latin America,
Second Edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.3.
14
Fitch, p.64.
J. Samuel Fitch, Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies: Context, Ideology, and
Doctrine in Argentina and Ecuador," Paper presented at the XIX Meeting of the Latin American Studies
Association, Washington, D.C.; Sept. 28-30, 1995, p. 1 3.
16
Fitch, p. 1 5.
"Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press
1987), p.365.
18 Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarian Brazil,"
Comparative Politics (July 1995): pp.425-443.
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CHAPTER 3
BRAZIL: BARGAINING FOR POLITICAL REALITY
In the Brazilian Republic, no one governs antagonizing the Armed Forces.
Gen. Octavio Costa (1992)
Participant in 1964 coup
After two decades of military rule, 1985 marked what was hoped to be a new
beginning in Brazilian history. For political scientists, questions as to how civil-military
relations in a democratic Brazil would unfold became of central concern. 1 The Brazilian
Armed Forces had interpreted their time in government as an attempt to translate Thomistic
principles of "order, obedience, authority, and stability," what Brian Loveman and Thomas
Davies have referred to as Hispanic antipolitics," to the State.' Alain Rouquie traced that
sense of moral superiority to the fact that in the Latin American context, many militaries
actually pre-dated the state. These armed organizations, therefore, considered themselves
the most qualified to determine what was in the best national, as opposed to
particular/political, interest. Cognizant of this tradition, the puzzle for Brazil in 1985, and
in many respects to this very day, was one of determining how this military self-conception
would fit into a new civilian-led democracy.
Two theses have emerged in answer to that query that represent opposite poles of
the civil-military spectrum. One theory, 3 in accord with Gen. Octavio Costa's opening
quote, argues that the military never truly gave up power. Jorge Zaverucha, in Rumor de
Sabres, applies that understanding to the Brazilian case. He contends that the Brazilian
military, in reality, controls the state through an active tutelary role. Zaverucha argues that
there is a strong likelihood of renewed intervention if military salaries fall to a certain
"intolerable" level or if the nation experiences a socio-politico-economic crisis that would
"require" the armed forces, as "guardians" of the state, to once again step into direct rule.4
The second theory, espoused by Wendy Hunter, concludes that the very essence of
electoral politics—self-interest (i.e. the desire to be re-elected)-in Brazil's clientelistic
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environment has not only neutralized military political influence, but has de facto alienated
the military from the political arena altogether. 5
Both arguments, however, are flawed. Zaverucha's "tutelary" theory, much of it
based upon the Sarney presidency, considers civil-military relations so static that it appears
to discount any real possibility of change. Hunter's argument, on the other hand, affords
Brazil s democratic transition too much fluidity, interpreting events such as the 1988
Constitution as a paradigm of civilian dominance which, as will be discussed, was far from
the case.
This chapter will attempt to demonstrate, through a close study of political and
economic events, that contemporary Brazilian civil-military relations fall between the
theoretical poles established by Zaverucha and Hunter. The Brazilian armed forces, in a
post-Cold War world and globalized economy that has eliminated much of the need for
internal and/or external defense, find themselves searching for a "raison d'etre."
Meanwhile those international factors have allowed civilian institutions to deepen their
foothold in government. Zaverucha's thesis diagrams an active military and a passive
civilian government. I argue, however, that those roles have reversed, yet not to the degree
Hunter describes. Rather than it dictating policy, the military has found itself forced to
negotiate or "bargain" for concessions in such a manner that benefits both itself and the
civilian sphere. Events, thus, have shown that the military is still a political variable that
not only needs to be addressed by any Brazilian executive, but can actually be manipulated
by the presidentfor political gain, taking advantage, ironically, of many of the same
inherent national political characteristics that Hunter relies on as proof of her thesis of the
military's waning role.
15
3.1 Research Approach
In studying Brazilian civil-military relations one first needs to address the event that
set the stage for much of the debate on the civil-military question in the 1990's: the drafting
of the 1988 Constitution. Relying on that document as a foundation, an analysis will be
made of the last three Brazilian presidencies; that of Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The rationale for selecting these three is that they, unlike
President Jose Sarney (1985-1990), are the first post-authoritarian, directly-elected
presidents (Itamar Franco, rose to the presidency due to the impeachment of President
Fernando Collor). Thus, they, in theory, would seem to represent civilian politics in its
most pure form, allowing for a more precise investigation of civil-military relations.
3.2 The 1988 Constitution
In 1988, the Brazilian people attempted to close a chapter of their authoritarian past
by drafting a new constitution. However, depending on which interpretation one accepts,
that document either demonstrated a new progressive departure from military influence or a
continuation of military power within government. Wendy Hunter, in her 1995
Comparative Politics article entitled "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military
in Postauthoritarian Brazil," cites Brazilian labor's guarantee, under the Constitution of
1988, of an unrestricted right to strike as proof that the Brazilian military's influence had
been neutralized by civilian politicians eager to appease potential voters. She explains that
if the military had still been a strong political actor it would have been adamant about
restricting labor unrest, after all, she concludes:
The socially disruptive effects of strikes—street protests, the destruction of
property, the failure to deliver goods and services-are antithetical to the core
military principles of order and discipline. 6
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Hunter s analysis of the reasons why labor control is desired by the military is absolutely
correct, yet what she fails to acknowledge is that in that very same constitution the military
was able to (through the use of permanent lobbyists) have their internal policing function
written into the new "law of the land." The armed forces, in effect, guaranteed the
perpetuation of an internal moderating role for themselves, similar to the one they had
enjoyed since the late 1 800 s which had offered them the legitimate opening to justify their
1964 coup. The constitutional delegates were, therefore, able to satisfy their constituents
while the military still had a rather ambiguous right to break a strike if it could be construed
as posing a threat to internal order or security. It would be that type of "concession or
compromise" politics that would most come to define Brazilian civil-military relations in the
1990's.
3.3 The Presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992)
With the first direct elections in nearly 30 years, the Brazilian people in 1989 rallied
to the polls and chose the vibrant, attractive, young candidate Fernando Collor de Mello.
Collor appeared to promise true change and a greater attempt at escaping the nation's
military past. This latter sentiment was seemingly evident at the presentation of his new
cabinet when his military ministers all appeared in civilian clothing; a clear departure from
their obsessive affinity for barracks attire which distinguished them from "common"
society. However, the question still remained as to whether this show of apparent civilian
domination could be backed with actions in times of civil-military discord. What Collor's
troubled presidency eventually proved was that the armed forces were not, in fact,
completely subordinated to executive command according to a strictly democratic
professionalist model, yet they were also not the active tutors of national political power
Zaverucha had described. Instead the military under Collor began a process of adapting
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itself to a new role which accepted the need for political negotiation, however reluctantly,
with the civilian executive for the attainment of mutual gain.
3.3.1 Disbanding of the Servigo National de Informagao (SNI) (National
Information/Intelligence Service)
In his first year as president, Collor, in a very publicized move, tackled the issue of
the armed forces directly by disbanding the military-run intelligence agency, the Servigo
Nacional de Informagao (SNI). The SNI was replaced by the newly-created Secretariat of
Strategic Affairs (SAE), whose director was to be a civilian. Such a radical decision
apparently gave credence to the thesis that the military, in effect, had become victim to the
whims of electoral politics. 9 However, a true measure of post-authoritarian Brazilian civil-
military power is only possible by an analysis of the underlying agreements and "deals"
between both sides.
In disbanding the SNI, Collor fulfilled the expectations of many who had voted for
him, since the power of successful electoral politics is about "supporting policies that
recognize popular desires for change, at least in some highly visible areas." 10 The SNI
presence within the Executive was definitely a "highly visible area," thus how better to gain
popularity than by defying the military and apparently succeeding.
Even a public protest by the former military chief of SNI appeared to be taken in
stride by the energetic president. When Gen. Luis de Araujo Braga assumed command of
the southeastern regional military district in May of 1990, he delivered a scathing speech
praising his days as past chief of the SNI and the role of that organization. He harshly
criticized those who referred to the SNI as "barbaric" or "abominable"; a less than subtle
jibe apparently aimed at the president. The public awaited Collor's response which he
reserved for a speech delivered five days later. Before 1200 Infantry soldiers and
surrounded by senior officers, the civilian president stated:
You gentlemen represent the loyal and disciplined obedience to the man that,
besides being the head of State and Government, by the free and direct choice of the
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Brazilian people, is also, by Constitutional disposition, the supreme commander of
our Armed Forces.
It truly appeared that civilian power was making a surge. However, it soon became evident
that such bravado was merely for valuable opinion ratings. The reality of the situation
involved a much more intricate negotiation not easily captured by television sound bites.
3. 3. 1.1 SNI Concessions
Brazilian presidents, like many other Latin American leaders, have to be experts in
the art of negotiation. They have to contend with incredible deficits, an economy balanced
on a tightrope, multiple clientelistic relationships, weak party bases, and a military that still
considers itself, in many regards, greater than the state. 12 As Jorge Zaverucha has implied,
it is implausible that the Brazilian military in 1990, enjoying a considerable degree of
internal cohesion, and who for generations held a philosophy of being the poder moderador
or moderating power, would merely accept attacks on its most prized possessions such as
its internal security community. 13 Collor was aware of this, thus his move was tempered
by much shifting of personnel and resources that guaranteed that his decision would not be
met with a high degree of military criticism.
The president's disbanding of the SNI was cushioned by a clever manipulation of
offices that had, in part, already been occurring for years. Throughout the Sarney
presidency (1985-1990), the Minister of the Military Staff Corps, Waldir Eduardo Martins,
in an attempt to avoid both the threatening autonomy of the SNI 14 and to guarantee greater
military experience in intelligence, in case of SNI dissolution, had linked many generals to
that agency. The result was that, with the disbanding of the SNI, many of those military
officers (because of their experience and knowledge) maintained high positions within the
newly formed civilian-led SAE while others simply returned to the barracks or offered their
expertise to the Army's intelligence agency (CEE). The rest were channeled into the
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Reserves. As for the active civilian agents in the SNI, they were guaranteed employment
within the national government due to a loophole in the civil service law. The only real
"losers" were the administrative support staff who were dismissed. 15
Collor was also afforded added security in making his seemingly "rash" decision,
because the military had long found the SNI a "double-edged sword." 16 The agency kept a
vigilant eye on potential subversion but the scope of their jurisdiction also reached the
armed forces themselves. Nearly every military promotion was delayed by the need for an
SNI investigation which tended to judge a candidate by political rather than merit criteria;
thus defying the military's deeply-believed sense of being the only honorable (merit-based)
means of social mobility in a country mired by clientelism. 17
3. 3. 1.2 Electoral Politics: Both Sides Win
As for electoral politics, the disbanding of the SNI guaranteed Collor broad public
support, greater freedom to operate (one less military official in his cabinet) and a
potentially less-biased flow of information into the presidential palace, since the SNI (with
its military chief) had been directly responsible for all executive intelligence. 18 While the
military maintained its presence to some extent in the security community, it did lose one
avenue of access to the president. But, more importantly, its relative peaceful acceptance of
Collor's decision bolstered the image of civilian-led democracy, and gave the general
population one less reason to fear the armed forces. As one political scientist
acknowledged:
[South American militaries] seek to avoid further politicization, factionalism, and
corruption, institutional strains resulting from military rule. Many such armed
forces also feel compelled to enhance their professional standing and repair their
public image. Reacting in too heavy-handed a manner to civilian efforts to
subordinate them would risk incurring negative public opinion and possibly civilian
sanctions. 19
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The military s acquiescence, therefore, could be interpreted as a smart political/public
relations tactic.
Finally, in an announcement whose timing seems to reflect a further concession by
CoHor, the new civilian-led SAE in 1990 recommended that the role of the military with
regard to the nation's nuclear energy activities be expanded. The SAE proposed the
construction of six nuclear reactors: 3 under the aegis of the Navy; 2 under the Air Force;
and 1 under the Army. 20
3.3.2 The Military Re-defines Itself as an Interest /Pressure Group
The concessions behind the disbanding of the SNI seemed emblematic of a new era
of civil-military relations in Brazil. Lacking a defined mission, and plagued by a tradition
of small budgets (dating back even to when it was in power) (table 3.1), the Brazilian
military has abandoned much of the "guardian" rhetoric that researchers such as Frederick
Nunn have alluded to in their works. 21 Instead the military appears to have adapted itself to
a new role as an interest group, "seeking to influence the debate on defense appropriations,
working, in particular, to solicit funds for both salaries and high-tech projects." 22 Contrary
to Zaverucha's thesis, the military's strength as a pressure group, seems not to emanate
from the threat of a unified attempt at another military government. In the twenty years the
military ruled the nation, it suffered from internal factionalism 23 and was unable to stabilize
the economy 24 or increase its own armed forces budget. Military appropriations actually
shrank dramatically during that period, even though the size of the military either remained
constant or increased (tables 3.1 & 3.2). Instead, the military's influence appears based on
a fear, shared by the senior command and the government, of "wildcat" coup attempts
(mutinies) led by disgruntled officers which threaten both the institution of the military and
the government's economic/political balance.
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The importance of military cohesion for both the armed forces and the government
was highlighted recently as current president Fernando Henrique Cardoso attempted to
establish trade ties with the European Union. Negotiation on that issue was contingent
upon the success of Cardoso's neo-liberal economic plan. Any disruptions in the barracks
held the potential to damage the nation's still shaky reputation on the international scene, as
many European officials, such as Helmut Kohl, remained skeptical as to the stability of that
Latin state. Lacking the Cold War's pretense of legitimacy, contemporary military
rumblings, regardless of their effective threat to civilian power, exacerbate domestic and
international apprehension along the entire social spectrum. This aversion is, in many
ways, a product of the post-Cold War globalization that has linked the world's business
communities and economies more intimately than ever
.
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The military senior command, meanwhile, fears division of its armed forces into
dissatisfied factions. This occurrence could not only disrupt the economy, but in the
process threaten military hierarchy/order and tarnish the relatively "clean" reputation the
armed forces enjoy as a body that seemingly represents an absence of the vices that
frustrate so much of Brazilian society . 26
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Table 3.
1
Military Expenditures as Percentage of GNP in Four Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 6
1972-1983
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay
1972 1.4 1.4 2.3 2.4
1973 1.7 1.4 3.7 2.4
1974 1.9 1.2 4.9 2.9
1975 0.8 1.1 4.8 2.7
1976 3.2 1.2 4.1 2.2
1977 3.2 1.0 4.0 2.4
1978 3.0 0.8 4.2 2.3
1979 3.2 0.7 3.6 2.4
1980 3.6 0.7 3.6 2.9
1981 3.9 0.7 3.7 4.0
1982 3.5 0.9 4.3 4.1
1983 2.7 0.7 4.5 3.3
Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (April 1984), pp. 17-49; and World Military’ Expenditures and Arms Transfer
1985 (August 1985), pp. 52-88.
Table 3.2
Armed-Force Size in Four Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina, Brazil Chile
and Uruguay
(in thousands)
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay
1972 140 410 75 20
1973 160 420 75 20
1974 150 435 90 25
1975 160 455 110 25
1976 155 450 111 28
1977 155 450 111 28
1978 155 450 111 28
1979 155 450 111 28
1980 155 450 116 28
1981 155 450 116 28
1982 175 460 116 29
1983 175 460 126 30
Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1972-1982, and 1985, pp. 17-49, and pp.52-88.
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3.3.2. 1 Pragmatic Politics: General Newton Cerqueira
General Newton Cerqueira, who during the military regime had been identified as a
hard-liner, recognized the new interest group mentality emerging in Brazilian civil-
military relations and used it as his platform in running for the presidency of the Military
Club of Rio in 1990. The Brazilian news weekly Istoe described Cerqueira as "dedicating
special attention to less noble problems such as salaries, pensions, and medical
coverage...."- 7 His opponent, General Diogo Figueiredo, attacked Cerqueira for what
seemed, according to Figueiredo, to be his opponent's attempted "unionization" of the
armed forces. Figueiredo, opted to campaign on traditional military themes of national
security and military prestige as an entity separate and superior to society. 28 The result of
the election seems to be quite telling of the military's new outlook in the 1990's, with
Cerqueira, the apparent "radical," winning.
Cerqueira drew national attention to himself not so much because his ideas were
novel, rather because they stated publicly what to a certain extent had been, and is today,
transpiring in Brazilian civil-military relations. The armed forces have, in effect,
abandoned much of their traditional condescendence toward the civilian sphere, in order to
reap practical returns.
29 The military leadership is acutely aware that, in light of the armed
forces' dismal record in power and the new "world order," 30 they can not afford to either
overthrow government or to isolate themselves. 31 As Wendy Hunter notes, in electorally-
driven politics they would be low on the list of budgetary priorities. 32 Admiral Armando
Vidigal, in a recent public letter summed up this Brazilian military reality stating:
...[T]he only escape from the moral crisis is that which is determined by democratic
means. There is no other....The military will contribute to that process by
remaining loyal to the principles of the constitution, along with the whims of
society. In that scenario, the fury of the legions will only express itself through the
vote. In a politically mature society, this is the only alternative that is available to
the legions, (emphasis mine) 33
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The Brazilian armed forces thus acknowledge that they too must play electoral
politics. Moreover, because of the very divided nature of Brazilian politics (parties in
Biazil are infamous for their lack of loyal adherents) 34 the military has the potential to serve
as a powerful political ally as would be evidenced during the presidency of Itamar Franco.
3.3.3 The Military Budget Under Collor
The budget is a polemical issue in any nation, however in Brazil, with the largest
foreign debt in Latin America and a pattern of skyrocketing inflation, it assumes
monumental importance. Under the 1988 Constitution, the budget for military salaries was
to be gauged to that of the legislative and judicial branches. However, table 3.3 indicates
that was rarely the case, as low salaries in the face of rising consumer prices made for very
tight times within the barracks.
Table 3.3
Monthly Salary Comparison
(in Cruzeiros-- 1992)
Military Executive Legislative Judicial
General Minister Deputy/Senator Minister
892 1,039 1,152 1,319
Colonel Executive Sec. Director Director-Gen.
651 515 1,167 948
Captain Dept. Director Leg. Assessor N/A
401 421 1,167
Lieutenant High-level Tech. High-level Tech. High-level Tech.
311 485 868 500
Sergeant Secretary Secretary Secretary
238 117 911 555
Corporal Driver Driver Driver
133 86 385 263
Source: Istoe, 10 July 91: pp. 18-19.
Patrice Franko explains this unequal phenomenon, in part, by writing, "As countries face
slow (or anemic) economic growth or have to transfer funds to service external debt, they
must resort to cuts in military spending."
35 Franko does, however, acknowledge that in
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nations such as Brazil, with strong institutionalized militaries, "the rate at which defense
spending declines often takes place at a much slower rate than the cuts applied to other
budget areas." 36 The latter was, in fact, the case during the Samey presidency.
3.3.3. 1 Mutual Sacrifice?
Nevertheless, by 1991 the military budget, traditionally small in Brazil (less than
2% of GDP), 37 had shriveled to 0.5% of the GDP. 38 A report released by the Staff Corps
of the Armed Forces in 1992 calculated military losses in real salary alone of 850% that
year.
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In the midst of such financial devastation, the military, according to Franko,
remained relatively passive primarily because the nation as a whole was suffering through a
period of tremendous economic stress and in a post-Cold War environment, the excuse of
greater salaries to fight subversion seemed out-dated. To support her argument she cites
the following statement issued by Collor’s Minister of Aeronautics, Lt. Brigadier Socrates
Monteiro in March of 1991:
While our Armed Forces clearly need to modernize their equipment, this will only
be possible when the economy is stabilized.40
That realism was also noted by Admiral Mario Cesar Flores in his book, Bases Para Uma
Poli'tica Militar, when he wrote:
Even with a growing economy. ..the priority of the Brazilian social and
infrastructural debt will impede real increases in the military budget in the near
future.
41
The problem for Flores, as well as Monteiro, was their frustration with the fact that the
Brazilian military budget had traditionally been one of the smallest per capita in Latin
America, yet kept decreasing. This understanding was aggravated by the notion that, as
Wendy Hunter cites, what little revenue the national government did have was divvied up
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primarily for civilian "spoils," a natural phenomenon of Brazilian electoral politics; she
notes:
The rampant pursuit of patronage resources by politicians not only clashes with the
long-standing positivist impulse within the military to 'rationalize' the public
bureaucracy. It also leads them into direct competition with military elites over state
resources. Politicians are tempted to shift budget shares away from the military to
civilian ministries better suited for pork barrel. Similarly, where military officers
hold key posts in large state enterprises-strategic positions from which to build a
network of political allies by distributing jobs and other benefits-patronage-seeking
politicians will try to replace them. The competition for resources is thus another
way m which the incentives unleashed by democratic competition militate against
the continued entrenchment of the military in the political and economic fabric of the
country 2
Based upon both Franko's and Hunter’s analyses, the military, appears to have very little
choice or power to alter the "new" political-economic reality. Despite these arguments,
events in 1991 and 1992 would prove that the armed forces still possessed a considerable
degree of political influence.
3. 3. 3.2 Mutual Sacrifice + Tradition = Political Leverage
Three months after Minister Monteiro made his initial conciliatory statement, he
demanded "salaries compatible with [the military's] functions as soon as possible." 43 How
can one explain this apparent contradiction, which Franko overlooks? One possible answer
appears to lie with the military's attempt to manipulate Brazilian popular opinion; a practice
which, as Hunter cited, is an inherent feature of electoral interest-oriented politics, even
though she only considered it as applying to civilians at the expense of the military. That
the Brazilian armed forces could even consider attempting such a ploy is very much
testament to the respect it still enjoys nationally (relative to other militaries with
bureaucratic-authoritarian pasts, i.e. that of Argentina).
44
In a nation infamous for civilian political corruption; incredible economic disparity
(which Francisco Weffort describes as "social apartheid")45 ; and a history of military
intervention, the well-publicized concept of "mutual sacrifice" between the traditionally
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powerful armed forces and the "common people" had the potential to become a public
lelations weapon. In an electorally-driven system, this translated into a negotiating
advantage. Both of Lt. Brigadier Monteiro's remarks reflect that understanding. Initially,
as Franko noted, he conceded that the armed forces would accept financial sacrifice just like
all Brazilians, evoking an image of military solidarity with the Brazilian citizenry. That
move, I argue, garnered the armed forces a generous degree of popular respect (which it
already had been cultivating since the SNI disbandment). This allowed Monteiro the
opportunity, three months later, to play the more traditional military card: demanding salary
increases, while remaining ambiguous as to what action the armed forces would take if the
request was ignored. Monteiro here thus relied on the classical definition of the Brazilian
military as "the purest image of society" 46 (i.e. less corrupt than civilian politicians); an
image that the armed forces' recent willingness to accept "belt-tightening" had only
enhanced (i.e. "we" sacrificed, but did "they"?). Apparently, Monteiro was hoping that the
sympathetic civilian population would feel "justifiably" threatened or motivated (depending
on the interpretation) by the unknown repercussions of his demand to pressure their own
intransigent elected representatives to accede.
The results of the military's apparent strategy were borne out in a July 1991
national survey conducted by Data Tres which noted that the majority of Brazilians favored
apportioning the military a salary increase;47 leaving unclear whether the outcome of the
survey was a reflection of a popular fear of a military so downtrodden that it could be
forced to coup or instead was a product of sympathy for the members of a once proud
organization.48 I argue that it was a combination of both. As Captain Jair Balsonaro
concluded, "the army is patriotic but it is not an idiot."49
3. 3. 3. 3 Collor Responds to Demands (Almost)
Both Collor and Monteiro were most likely aware that the probability of another
military government or even a broadly supported coup were unlikely, but the military did
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have the potential to disrupt the president's already dire politico/economic program. In an
environment where mere hints of national problems can send stocks and the currency on a
downward spin, it was imperative for Collor to somehow placate the military leadership.
Collor's armed forces ministers had to contend with rumors of sporadic revolts50 from an
increasingly disgruntled junior officer corps which felt slighted by both the pdtria and its
own senior command. 51
Emblematic of the mutually beneficial role of contemporary Brazilian civil-military
relations, Collor answered the military's demands in a way he appears to have hoped
would offer him a weapon in his losing battle with the legislature. One year and a half into
his presidency, Collor's economic and political agendas were in chaos. Interbranch
antagonism over inflation, privatization, and the presidential ego opened what was soon to
become an insurmountable rift between the executive and the congress. 52 Isolated
politically, Collor apparently viewed the military and its demands as an "ace" in the game of
political poker.
Relying on presidential privilege, Collor in late June of 1991 issued a "temporary
measure" finally instituting an armed forces salary increase. To the casual observer it
would seem that Collor had caved in to military pressure. However, under Brazilian law,
an executive "temporary measure" only becomes effective if the congress fails to act upon it
within thirty days. Since military funding is normally a low legislative priority in Brazil,
according to Hunter, much less when it is imposed by an unpopular president, the measure
was defeated (to resounding applause in the legislative chamber).53 The outcome was so
transparent that one must question the motives behind such an ill-fated presidential
decision.
The president's strategy was to appear sympathetic to the military's plight, all the
while recognizing that the congress would never approve his measure. That branch's
refusal, Collor hoped, would channel the armed forces' ire onto the congress, while
affording him a valuable military alliance that could be tapped as leverage in later executive-
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legislative negotiations, alluding to an auto-golpe scenario. Unfortunately for Collor, his
gamble did not succeed, as many senior officers interpreted the temporary measure's defeat
as further evidence of the president's weakness. 54
Nevertheless, a "secret executive budget" was discovered two months later, that
appeared to be an attempt by Collor to keep the military, if not on his side, then at least
neutral. This "budget" circumvented congress and allocated over $5 billion Cruzeiros to
the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) (in which many military officers worked) and to
the three branches of the armed forces (table 3.4).
Table 3.4
Fernando Collor de Mello's "Secret Budget"
SAE $5,200,000,000 (Cruzeiros)
Air Force $290,000,000
Navy $59,000,000
Army $9,000,000
~
Source: Istoe, "P090 sem fundo," 14 August 91
:
p. 1 9.
3.3.4 Impeachment (1992)
According to many of the generals responsible for the intervention of 1964, the
main impetus for their actions was a sense of social chaos and a direct threat to their
institution.
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If politics degenerate and "endanger the national honor and integrity," then it
is assumed in traditional Latin American military circles that the "patriotic duty of the armed
forces [is to] reimpose order." 56 Jorge Zaverucha noted that one of the scenarios in which
the Brazilian military would abandon, what he felt, was its active tutelary role over
government and resort, once again, to direct intervention was if Brazil experienced a
"worsening of a socio-politico-economic crisis." 57 Based upon these criteria, the events of
1992 would seem to indicate that a coup was imminent. Fernando Collor, who had never
been extremely popular with the armed forces, was embroiled in a scandal that threatened
the nation's executive branch; inflation was climbing rapidly; Brazil's real growth rate for
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that year was a dismal -0.9%; 58 and the nation's two major stock markets were
plummeting, as was the already low value of the national currency, the Cruzeiro.59
Furthermore, the armed forces, as an institution, was experiencing its worst economic
crisis in over thirty years.
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Yet, the military did not intervene; why?
The answer to that query, I contend, rests with a combination of explanations some
of which have already been alluded to. First, in late May of 1992, Collor sent his Minister
of Economics, Marcflio Marques Moreira, on a "damage control" mission to shore up key
political and economic support that seemed poised to disappear in light of the unfolding
executive scandal. Moreira not only contacted the nation's major industrial and business
figures, but also those of the international community. Most importantly, for the purposes
of this study, he personally went to the main barracks and met with all the ministers of the
armed forces assuring them that their budget would be revamped that same year.61
The second possible explanation for the armed forces' acquiescence is that with
impeachment apparently secure, the military could simply wait for Collor's vice-president,
Itamar Franco, who had a reputation of being more amenable to the armed forces, to
assume the executive. Such a strategy of restraint would enhance the military's appearance
to the public which, in turn, could prove useful in subsequent bargaining. Even Collor's
minister of the Army, Gen. Carlos Tinoco, the most conservative of all the military cabinet
members, appeared to have understood the advantages of this new civil-military
relationship when he stated:
The Army, more than ever, will maintain itself within the strict confines of the its
constitutional duties. And it takes great pleasure in hearing the praises that this
stand has garneredfrom all the sectors ofnational life andfrom the international
community itself (emphasis mine)62
It may also be argued, contrary to Zaverucha's prediction, that had impeachment
not been such a certainty, the military might still have refrained from intervention for the
following reasons. First, as 1964 proved, a temporary intervention may not be enough to
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satiate military officers who may feel that there is no civilian or group of civilians
competent enough to whom power could be handed over. 63 This possibility must have
weighed on the minds of the senior command as elements within the Brazilian officer corps
still recalled the institutionally-threatening factionalism created by their twenty years in
power.64 As Guillermo O'Donnell noted:
Although there is a high probability of internal cohesion when the military is
dedicated to a strictly professional conception of its functions, this probability is
bound to diminish as the military assumes and exercises governmental power. 65
Second, with an economy that was cited as one of the, if not the, worst in Latin America,
the armed forces, cognizant of their prior catastrophic economic record in government (in
1982, they were actually forced to admit publicly "that the country was on the verge of
insolvency ), may have concluded that a coup in 1992 would have been akin to taking
over a "sinking ship" and should they not be able to produce economic success on their
"watch," they would only risk further tarnishing their reputation.67 Finally, contrary to the
auto-golpe strategy of President Fujimori in Peru, military rule in today's post-Cold War
world, has a greater probability to suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Unlike an authoritarian
civilian regime, a military government would at some point be perceived as solely a
"military dictatorship" with all the accompanying connotations of human rights violations,
lack of civil liberties, etc..68 Ironically, those same "evils" may be part of a civilian
dictatorship as well, but the mere fact that it is a civilian government somehow filters many
of those negative images. 69
3.4 The Presidency of Itamar Franco (1992-1994)
The Itamar Franco period in Brazilian history will, unfortunately, most likely be
remembered for the president's numerous social blunders. 70 Yet, less memorable but more
important was Franco's civil-military negotiating that manipulated both the Brazilian armed
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forces history and their new interest/pressure group orientation,71 eventually reaping
political rewards for the nation's next president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Assuming the presidency in October of 1992, Franco had the monumental challenge
of trying to salvage an economy in shambles.72 He had no success (the economy actually
worsened) until he transferred renowned sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso from his
post as Minister of Foreign Affairs to that of Minister of Economics. 73
Cardoso s ultimate success in the economics office was based upon a program of
currency conversion, massive spending cuts, increased privatization, and greater world
market inclusion; all features that seemed anathema to much of the Brazilian military
establishment. This apprehension was only aggravated by the fact that Cardoso had been
exiled in 1964 and had upon his return been "the" representative of the intellectual
opposition. 74
3.4.1 The Military as an Interest to be Courted
In 1993 Cardoso proposed a series of major reductions in government
expenditures, yet assured the military that it would be left untouched. However, Cardoso
soon found himself forced to renege on his promise and by year's end indicated that the
military would not escape the economic ax with what would, in essence, amount to a 40%
cut in their budget of $21 billion Cruzeiros. The Brazilian armed forces, which already
received the least amount of money per capita of all the major nations in Latin America and
beyond (table 3.5), reacted fervently.
Table 3.5
Military Expenditures Per Capita
(in US$)
USA Gr. Britain Chile Argentina Mexico Brazil
902 395 55 35 10 7
Source: The Military Balance—IISS 1992/1993
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In what was perhaps their strongest criticism of civilian government since turning over
power in 1985, the head of the Military Staff Corps severely chastised Cardoso for his
austerity program. President Franco, realizing that military support in a tortuous political
environment such as Brazil's could prove valuable, intervened to prevent a major
showdown between the military and his government. Franco guaranteed that the armed
forces would be spared the budget cuts and that they would be able to secure their pet
projects such as the nuclear submarine and space programs. 75
3.4. 1.1 The PT and the Military?
The importance of military support became clear early in the 1994 presidential
election year when the military's traditional arch-rival, the socialist Workers' Party (PT),
published a study that was highly sympathetic to the armed forces. The study
demonstrated that the military did not have the capacity, in its then state of financial
malaise, to defend the nation should an emergency arise. Furthermore, the PT also began
abandoning its traditional aversion to national conscription. This abrupt about-face was
concisely summed-up by a general in the Staff Corps: "There is no mutual good-feeling in
the coming-together of the PT and the military. It's pure pragmatism."76 Nevertheless, the
PT, who in January of 1994 appeared to be the party closest to the next presidential
victory, piqued the military's interest because it appeared to be the only organized and
effective political entity that recognized the need for an increase in the military's budget for
the national good.
3.4. 1.2 Building an Executive-Military Alliance, Part I
With the new leverage garnered from the PT's declaration of support, the military
now became a pivotal chess piece in the game of electoral politics. With presidential
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elections scheduled for October of 1994, rumors of Fernando Henrique Cardoso running
against the PT's immensely popular Luis "Lula" Inacio da Silva began to circulate in the
early months of the year. In February of that year, in a decision whose timing seems to
suspiciously indicate an attempt to regain military backing that may have slipped to the
PT,77 Franco had his Minister of the Army announce publicly that the armed forces would
that year receive the first of four annual US$200 million payments to purchase new
equipment. 78 What is particularly striking about this declaration is that Franco himself did
not make the announcement, which had he done so, would have further increased his
popularity among the men in arms. Apparently, in a time of tremendous national "belt-
tightening, the last thing the President desired was to be seen on national television giving
anyone or any organization $800 million U.S. dollars.
3.4. 1.3 Building an Executive-Military Alliance, Part II
The loosening of funds for military expenses was only the first step of political
"deal-making" between the executive and the armed forces. One week after the momentous
military budget announcement. Franco disclosed that he was shuffling his cabinet. General
Rubens Bayma Denys, who had been a member of Sarney's inner circle, was appointed
Minister of Transportation. That selection brought the grand total of military
representatives in the presidential palace to seven (table 3.6).
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Table 3.6
Chief of the Military Staff Corps Adm. Amaldo Leite Pereira
Minister of the Army Gen. Zenildo de Lucena
Minister of the Navy Adm. Ivan Serpa
Minister of the Air Force Gen. Lelio Lobo
Minister of the SAE ## Adm. Mario Cesar Flores
Chief of the Secretariat for Federal
Administration **
Gen. Romildo Canhim
Minister of Transportation ** Gen. Rubens Bayma Denys
^Brazil's intelligence agency which was originally formed under Collor for the purpose of replacing the
military-run SNI. ^ 6
**Not traditionally military appointments
This apparent "militarization" of government was rather alarming to many within the
civilian sector, but the logic of it soon became evident.
3.4.2 The "Real" Plan
Fernando Henrique Cardoso's political aspirations, as well as the hopes of the
Brazilian nation, were soon revealed to be hinged upon a currency conversion and
indexation plan known as the "Unit of Real Value" (Unidade de Valor Real) or Real Plan,
that was to be implemented in 1994. However, for that plan to have any hope of success it
would first need to be approved in the congress and bypass any legal challenge in the
judiciary. Unfortunately for Cardoso, the Real plan's conversion factor would result in a
10.94% real salary loss for the members of the legislative and judicial branches. 79 Thus,
the plan was delayed as an interbranch battle ensued. It was at this point that the deals
between the military and the executive reaped rewards.
By increasing the number of military officers in his presidential cabinet, Franco had
fortified the executive branch with representatives of an organization that was supposed to
earn as much as the judiciary or the legislature by law. However, as table 3.3 noted, that
had rarely been the case in the previous four years. The military, thus, had little to lose
36
under the new economic plan. Therefore, when the legislative and judicial branches stalled
implementation of the Real plan due to issues of their own salary, they were confronting
an ambiguous executive-military alliance which did not seem to bode well for their
continued existence. This anxiety was only exacerbated by such comments as that made by
the Minister of the Military Staff Corps: "If it's a confrontation between the branches that
they [Legislature and Judiciary] want, then the military is ready." 80 Ultimately, the judicial
obstacle was overcome and after continued negotiation the Real Plan was implemented in
July of 1994.
3.4.3 The Changing Definitions of Poder Moderador
The political "war games" conducted by Itamar Franco altered the course of the
1994 presidential campaign, allowing Cardoso's Real Plan the leeway necessary to be
effective. The plan drastically reduced inflation and created relative economic stability,
given Brazil's recent economic history. This, in turn, reaped electoral rewards for the
Economics Minister in the October presidential election. What Franco's negotiations
demonstrated was that the military had not necessarily become a non-factor in
contemporary Brazilian electoral politics. Much to the contrary, the armed forces appeared
to have learned to take advantage of their position as the armed segment of a post Cold War
democratic society by imposing themselves as valuable political allies or uncomfortable
foes. They have, in effect, re-defined the meaning of poder moderador. No longer do they
"moderate" politics as a type of mythical guardian solely capable of discerning evil and
purity.
81
Instead they can moderate power because of the disruptions they can cause to
political and economic strategies. As General Newton Cerqueira realized during his
aforementioned campaign for presidency of the Military Club of Rio, the contemporary
Brazilian military's existence is dependent on involvement within the civilian political
system that many officers in the past had so despised. 82
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3.4.3. 1 "Delegative Democracy" and the Zaverucha and Hunter Theories
Franco's intervention and his later negotiations with the military would be one more
example in a series of events that further gave credence to the thesis that the military
remains an influence in Brazilian politics, yet not to the degree Jorge Zaverucha believed.
If the military was still the all-powerful dictator of government policy, as that Brazilian
social scientist argues, particularly policy vis-a-vis the armed forces, then one must ask
why a unified military would allow its traditionally small budget to be cut over the last half
decade to such extreme levels, forcing even basic military practices and services to be
discontinued?83 Moreover, why would senior elements within the armed forces, such as
General Cerqueira, recognize a need to re-define the military's mission with relation to the
political sphere, if, as Zaverucha claimed, it already enjoyed a privileged insider position?
Thus, the static conception of military tutelage appears invalid.
Nevertheless, in order to accept Hunter's diametrically-opposed theory, that the
military is no longer a political actor, one would need to defy both facts and logic. Hunter
argues that Brazilian politics (primarily with reference to the legislature) are prone to
rational choice individualism with little or no conception of party line and/or party loyalty
and much less, any interest in "wasting" valuable patronage funds on the armed forces.
Much of her evidence is valid. Indeed party politics in Brazil are notoriously fickle and
clientelism and patronage are inherent features. As Joel Migdal has noted, in states with
weak institutions, political self-preservation may be too overriding a temptation:
...an inadequate power base for the state makes it a tempting prize for those who do
have some organizational backing, either in society at large or even within one of
the state's many tentacles. But the prize is often chimerical, for what aspiring
leaders seize is not the capability to transform their societies in accordance with their
goals, but simply seats coveted by others. Just to preserve their seats, they must
adopt means that foreclose the use of power to fulfill their original purposes.
Instead, substantive policy issues are pushed to the back burner. 84
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Yet, in this context, how is the Brazilian president expected to succeed, for his constituency
is the nation? As Robert Dahl noted, "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government [read: the President] to the preferences of its
citizens ...." 85
Because of that very dilemma, and in light of the military's adaptation to a more
interest-group format (abandoning abstract themes in order to gain practical concessions), it
will be very difficult for a Brazilian president to resist the temptation to bargain with the
armed forces. Migdal elaborates: "Lacking the means to mobilize sustained and organized
internal support, leaders of weak states [i.e. states with weak institutions] must
increasingly turn their attention to staying in power...." 86 Accordingly, the military may
win a periodic perk, through bargaining, costing the president relatively little, yet winning
him an executive-military alliance that could reinforce his negotiating position vis-a-vis the
fractious legislature. That legislature may interpret the president's implicit alliance as a
threat (auto-golpel) to their institution and may opt to take a short-term loss, (i.e. work
with the president) in return for the promise of the being able to preserve their patronage
trough. Guillermo O’Donnell dubbed this sort of executive phenomenon, which appears to
be authoritarian rule under the guise of democracy, "delegative democracy." Under this
concept, the will of the people is embodied in the president's ability to "get things done" at
the national level, regardless of the manner in which that is accomplished. Hunter
acknowledges this type of presidential strategy, but dismisses it as a symptom of a weak
individual in the executive. Yet, her analysis of the Brazilian congress presents a system so
divided among individual interests, that any president, regardless of his strengths or
weaknesses, may be forced at one point or another to resort to using the military as a type
of "swing vote."
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3.5 The Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-?)
Fernando Henrique Cardoso has demonstrated that he understands the importance,
perhaps more than anyone, of negotiating with the military. His Real plan has been
considered one of the world's economic success stories. 87 It has nonetheless required
much belt-tightening, from which the armed forces have not escaped. The military's
budget situation, regardless of the $200 million yearly allocation for equipment is still quite
dismal. Humorous stories of its plight abound, such as soldiers who in 10 weeks of basic
training are only allowed to fire five real bullets or the more serious tale of Brazil's inability
to meet United Nations' peacekeeping efforts due to a lack of funds. 88 However, what
differentiates this sacrifice from that of the Collor presidency is that Cardoso has brought
Brazil to the cusp of the "elite club" of world powers. Under Cardoso the National
Treasury's receipts grew by 18% in real terms during the first seven months of 1995 and
the consumer price index improved from 41.3% in January of 1994 to 1.4% in January of
1995. 89 Meanwhile, on the international scene, no longer is Brazil regarded as the nation
with unfulfilled potential. Instead, it is now being referred to as the "engine of the
Mercosur accord," and Cardoso appears to want to expand upon that distinction by recently
leading negotiations in Europe to sign a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the
E.U.. In addition, there is growing talk of Brazil's entry into the United Nations Security
Council. 90
3.5.1 Human Rights Accusations: Handle With Care
Despite its relative acquiescence in terms of its budget, the military in Brazil, like its
neighboring Argentine counterpart, does not tolerate accusations of human rights violations
very easily. The military's self-written Amnesty Law of 1979 is one example of that
aversion, but more telling has been the unspoken agreement amongst politicians not to
delve too deeply into human rights investigations.
91
Cardoso, the radical scholar turned
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politician, riding on a wave of popular support, appeared, less than one year into his
presidency, poised to defy that tacit understanding.92 Reflective of his past as an
intellectual critic of the military government, he was revered by those who suffered under
that regime s persecution as their greatest hope for closure to that troubling time.
Therefore, in August of 1995 the Brazilian government took definitive steps towards
admitting responsibility for the disappearance of 136 Brazilians between 1964 and the
establishment of the Amnesty Law of 1979. Cardoso moved to publish the names of the
"disappeared" and agreed to pay reparations ranging from (R)$ 100,000 to $150,000 to the
families of the victims.
The dilemma for Cardoso, however, was how to reconcile the interests of a vocal
segment of the civilian population along with his own personal inclinations with that of the
armed forces that were, in essence, being accused of wrongdoing for what many within the
military felt was a "just war." Brian Loveman, describing the military's logic behind such
an assertion, notes:
At war, the rules of war apply. The basic rule of war is that the enemy may be
killed.. ..If political opponents become "enemies" in a war, undeclared or declared,
their extirpation is no longer a violation of human rights or even a common crime
’
but rather a legitimate function of armies engaged in combat. 93
With that mind-set, Cardoso's announcement touched off minor barrack revolts in bases
around the nation. The matter had the potential to unravel and threaten the fragile political
and economic balance Cardoso had tried so hard to build. Reacting quickly, the president
set upon a course of internal diplomacy, first by stating:
As the Head of State and of the Government, elected by the people, and as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, it is up to me to assume, for the State,
the responsibilities of transgressions committed against the law or human rights. 94
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In making such a pronouncement, Cardoso, deflected the responsibility of the
"disappeared" away from the military. However, this act masked a more complex series of
negotiations between the executive and the armed forces.
Cardoso's military cabinet-members proved to be effective allies in averting a
possible civil-military crisis. The minister of the Army personally took the President to
Rio's military headquarters so that the high command could be directly assured that
publication of the disappeared list would not lead to torture investigations. Meanwhile,
frustrated officers were advised" by the military cabinet to retire and collect their pensions.
What truly added to the quality of the civil-military "deal" was Cardoso's signing, less than
two weeks after the start of this incident, of a temporary measure which guaranteed the
armed forces a 20% salary readjustment along with an added, undefined "provisional
gratuity."
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Unlike Collor, whose aforementioned temporary measure attempt was doomed
to failure, Cardoso enjoyed enough support within the legislature to make such a tactic
feasible.
The "disappeared" episode perhaps more than any other incident in recent Brazilian
history, succinctly defines the bargaining nature of contemporary civil-military relations.
Cardoso needed to prove (for present and future electoral success) that he could stand by
his principles and accommodate the desires of the civilian population, in areas other than
economics; while the military needed a pay increase. Thus, the President and the military
compromised. Each was victorious: Cardoso proved himself a champion of those whose
voices had been silenced, while the military could take refuge in knowing that accusations
of torture would be muted and they would, in return, be given a salary bonus.
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3.6 Conclusion
It is not in the army that one can find the remedy for the ills of the army but in the
country.
De Tocqueville, Democracy in America
The armed forces in Brazil seem to be evolving along with transformations in their
country. Thirty years ago, the thought that the military would have to compromise with a
government that enjoys little or no respect in the barracks was inconceivable. At that time,
the world was trapped in a Cold War mentality where "threats" to national sovereignty
could come, not only across borders, but also from within. In the mid-1990's, however,
talk of "subversion" is laughable. Moreover, borders themselves have less significance as
expansion of the "global market" has made traditional enemies now intimate trading
partners (e.g. Brazil and Argentina). Much of the Brazilian military's "metamorphosis" is
also a product of its painful experience in government, where all the shortcomings of the
armed forces were placed in the spotlight. Today, military contempt for civilian power has
to be weighed against the damage a potential intervention could cause the military institution
itself; as one senior officer concluded, "We [the military] have more than enough problems
of our own." 96
This new understanding, while weakening military dominance, has strengthened
Brazilian civil institutions' position, albeit within a defective political system. The
legislature, mired by disunity, appears non-inclined to continue supporting a military that
offers it little in return. The executive, confronted by a multiplicity of national and
international demands, would also prefer to ignore the armed forces. Nevertheless, the
president is cognizant that to allow the military's economic plight to deteriorate excessively
may pose problems for the smooth functioning of his policies. Dissatisfaction within the
military may create uncontrollable rifts in the armed establishment potentially leading to
sporadic, violent protests. Thus, the Brazilian executive appears content to allow the
legislature to tear away at the military's budget, until demands by the armed forces reach a
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breaking point. In that scenario, and unlike the traditional "tutelary" model, the civilian
president gains an "active" bargaining position vis-a-vis the armed forces. The military's
threat to him stems from a possibility of a break in its chain of command
(factionalism/mutinies); a danger of more paramount importance for officers as it emperils
the fundamental pillar-hierarchy-of the military institution. With that "active" negotiating
advantage, the president is able to manipulate the military by allocating economic "band-
aid" measures or by affording the armed forces leeway to pursue their internal, autonomous
interests such as strategic defense of the Amazon . 97 These concessions can be doled out
with little or no short-term cost to the executive and can actually profit the president by
creating a military predilection for him (alliance) over the intransigent, divided legislature.
Of course, the long-term repercussions of executive-military alliance-making remain
to be seen. Bargaining in civil-military relations "involves cooperation versus defiance ." 98
This concept, by its very definition contradicts the democratic professionalist military
model (the United States paradigm) that many scholars see as a goal for a true democracy.
In a democratic professionalist armed forces, both civilian authority and democracy are held
as mission priorities .99 When the president resorts to allying himself with the military he
reinforces the historically accepted notion, on the part of the armed forces and many of
those prominent in Brazilian society, that liberal democracy is somehow inappropriate for
that Portuguese-speaking country.
Executive-military negotiation, in circumventing the congress, violates a principal
tenet of the federalist democratic code: constitutional separation of powers and checks and
balances. If Brazilian parties are not strengthened, this "delegative democratic" practice
will most likely continue. If so, the nation runs the risk that (a) the president may
eventually monopolize governmental power or (b) the military may become more
demanding in its pre-requisites for supporting the executive. The former [a] has already
occurred in Peru under Fujimori and to a degree in Argentina under Menem. While the
latter [b] raises the threat of the armed forces developing an ethos of "conditional
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subordination," whereby the executive may find himself forced to concede more than he
would like. Samuel Fitch notes:
Under certain circumstances...civilian leaders may be able to impose a substantial
degree of democratic control without institutionalization, for example where the
political context leaves the military no other alternative. Under these conditions
however, democratic control is likely to be unstable and transient; circumstantial
changes in the political context—a prolonged bout of hyperinflation, the death or
discrediting of the president, or increased political violence-may re-open old
options or new alternatives for military intervention
.
100
Though this chapter has shown that a military coup seems unlikely in this "new world
order," it has also demonstrated that contemporary Brazilian civil-military relations retain a
considerable degree of ambiguity. Civilians, today, cannot be considered prisoners to
military dictates. Nevertheless, the armed forces remain political actors. Should civil-
military bargaining escalate, this ambiguous co-existence may perpetuate an inclination to
authoritarianism (civilian, military or both) with uncertain ramifications for the Brazilian
people.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINING DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA VIA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
In analyzing Brazilian civil-military relations, the measuring standard was the
United States model of a professional military subordinated to democratic civilian control.
However, as the Brazilian case illustrated, the democratic discourse is not uniform
worldwide. An analysis of Argentina reinforces that understanding. Argentine political
scientist Atilio Boron has noted that nowhere in the Argentine constitution can one even
find the word "democracy." 1 Ultimately what has emerged in both Brazil and Argentina is
an amalgam of liberal democratic principles adapted (mutated?) to a particular political
reality. In this environment, some elements of a democracy are accepted and implemented
while others remain alienated as symbols of weakness.
In Argentina, President Raul Alfonsm was elected in 1983 with a commitment to
open democracy and a mandate of bringing the military to justice. His campaign platform
declared. Democracy cannot live in this country while the Armed Forces set themselves as
the arbiters of sovereignty, and with an Armed Forces that place their own corporate
interests above their professional obligations."' The first post-authoritarian executive,
Alfonsm hoped to create a strong democratic foundation for the future of Argentina. This
new Argentina, he hoped, was to be imbued with respect for the separation of powers and
with intrinsic military subordination. Thus, in Alfonsin's perception, civil-military
bargaining would not be a necessity. Severely fractured, the disgraced and humiliated
armed forces appeared, in 1983, to be in no position to contest this new executive outlook.
Alfonsin's optimism hinged on one key issue: the speedy and neat resolution of
human rights trials. Without it, nothing else would be possible. The dilemma for Alfonsm
was that his conception of justice would only prosecute the men in charge (the military
junta members) during the Proceso de Reorganization National and amnesty the vast
majority of lower and middle-ranking officers whom he felt were simply following orders.
However for the thousands of families of those who had been kidnapped, tortured and
51
murdered in the quest for ideological conformity, orders to terrorize were not warranted
and could not be excused. These families clamored for vindication; for the punishment of
the murderers of their individual son, daughter, parent, and so on. President Alfonsin,
adamant about eliminating any hint of elite "deal-making," abided by the separation of
powers ultimately allowing the multiplicity of civilian legal claims through the judiciary to
determine the course of his presidency. Ironically, the national zeal to punish the military
establishment re-united the divided armed forces and led to a succession of military
rebellions that ultimately forced Alfonsin, reluctantly, to the civil-military bargaining table.
In a nation still reeling from the nightmare of the military government, this "surrender," on
the part of the president, coupled with his failing economics was disastrous. Eventually,
the exigencies of faithfulness to democratic rule took their toll on Raul Alfonsin leading him
to retire in 1989.
Alfonsm's self-defeating passion for democracy ultimately displayed his many
weaknesses and led, in part, to his collapse as a viable national leader. His successor.
Carlos Menem, learned from those mistakes and has taken a determined reverse course.
Menem has actively negotiated with the armed forces, circumventing laws created to curb
such a practice. His revisionist approach to the military appears to be one more example of
his political psyche. Viewing politics as a zero-sum game, Menem sees centralized power
as the ultimate end and democracy as a mere detail. Conforming to the O'Donnell
delegative democracy model, Menem favors accomplishments, rather than democracy. He
sees these as the ultimate measuring stick of his presidency. The public appears to agree,
as he was elected to a second term in 1995.
4.1 The Presidency of Raul Alfonsin: Prioritizing Democracy
Elected in 1983, Raul Alfonsin faced a military that was at its lowest point in
Argentine history. Economic failure, rampant internal divisiveness, and the shame of the
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Malvinas fiasco had taken a heavy toll on the armed forces. 3 Moreover, public
condemnation of the armed establishment was intense. Alfonsm realized that this was the
ideal time to eliminate the military's "reserve domain" of power within Argentine society.
Negotiation with the armed forces, Alfonsm hoped, would soon become a thing of the
past. His goal, as well as that of the nation, was the subordination of the armed forces to
civilian authority and the creation of a vibrant democracy; a relatively novel concept to the
Argentine people. 4
Shortly after he took office, Alfonsm began his quest for greater military
accountability. He reduced the defense budget by half, forced two-thirds of the army
generals and one-third of the navy admirals into retirement, and discharged three-quarters
of the conscripts. In addition, he cut the salaries of officers and NCO's. He also created a
civilian Ministry of Defense overseeing the different service branches. As a result of
Alfonsfn's initiative, the National Security Doctrine which had originally fed the flames of
military intervention in the 1970 s was repealed. This did not, necessarily, represent the
emergence of democratic civil-military relations, yet as Samuel Fitch noted, "the lack of a
clear anti-democratic alternative [was] at least a modest step forward relative to the 1960’s
and 1970's." 6
For the elimination of the National Security Doctrine to have any true effect,
Alfonsm and his party, the Union Civica Radical (UCR), realized that any internal military
policing function needed to be excised. The Internal Service Regulations of the Argentine
Army in 1983 still defined the military's role as:
...safeguarding the highest national interests of the Nation. ..to defend its honor, its
territory, the Constitution of the Argentine Nation and its law, guaranteeing the
maintenance of internal peace and insuring the normal operation of its institutions. 7
The highly subjective definition of "internal peace" had been used too often as an excuse
for military coups. Thus, debate began in 1984 to create a National Defense Law to clear
up any dangerous ambiguity. The law, which was eventually passed in 1988, "stated
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unequivocally that internal security and political intelligence was banned for the armed
forces. 8 Toward this same end, Alfonsfn also replaced all the military officers in the
nation’s intelligence agency, the Secretariat of State Intelligence (.Secretaria de Inteligencia
de Estado—SIDE) with civilians.
4.1.1 Human Rights: The Burden of History Becomes Heavier
In one of his most anticipated post-authoritarian acts, Alfonsfn repealed the
military's self-amnesty shortly after taking office. The President viewed this decision as
essential, as only through a trial of the Proceso leaders would the nation rid itself of the
burden of the past. Unfortunately for Alfonsfn, that same act released the collective
repression of the nation and ultimately led to his political demise.
Alfonsfn was cognizant of the special role in Argentine politics and society that the
military had occupied for years. He foresaw that a military hunted by civilians for human
rights violations would only close in on itself and become defensive; defeating the
psychological purpose of the trials. The president felt that the military needed to self-
examine its role in the "dirty war" to purge itself of the seeds of evil that had led it to
commit such atrocities. Thus, he initially allowed military courts to determine the fate of its
own officers. However, the military hearings proved problematic since many officers
considered the eradication of subversion as the only "victory" of the entire Proceso. This
was clearly evident in official military literature published as late as 1983. In what the
military entitled its "Final Document of the Military Junta Regarding the War Against
Subversion and Terrorism: The Fundamental Concepts," the armed forces stated:
It is addressed, first of all, to us, the people of the nation victim of an aggression
[subversion] it did not deserve, invaluable and dedicated participant in the final
victory.
9 (emphasis mine)
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The military courts were unable to reach a decision, but nevertheless concluded "that the
orders issued by the juntas during the Proceso to combat terrorism were
'unobjectionable.'" 10
Faced with the military's judicial intransigence, Alfonsfn created the National
Commission on the Disappearances of Persons (CONADEP). This body began the
arduous process of civilian trials of senior officers accused of human rights atrocities.
Eventually five of the nine military junta members were found guilty and imprisoned.
4. 1 . 1 . 1 The Media Factor and Pandora's Box
The demise of the Proceso also represented the end of media censorship. A long-
restrained press hungry for the truth that it had been denied, televised the junta's trials and
delved deeper into the buried facts of the cases ultimately discovering multiple tales of
military atrocities. 1
1
The very visible defiance with which many of the accused conducted
themselves during the hearings along with the descriptions of torture and murder pressured
the nation s representatives to push for the extension of the human rights trials to junior
officers. Such a move, both Alfonsfn and the military realized, had incredible
ramifications. Alfonsfn had felt that only the Proceso leadership was truly culpable as the
rest of the military was simply carrying out orders. However, gruesome revelations
brought to the national attention whipped the populace into a frenzy. 12
Since officers had been rotated frequently during the dirty war to avoid prolonged
contact with "subversives," hundreds were implicated in the repression. 13 Alfonsfn,
struggling to control the nation's shaky economy, decided that the democratic course of
action he had allowed to unfold now required some control. In December of 1986 he
submitted to Congress a Punto Final bill (Spanish expression meaning "final stop"). This
bill imposed a 60 day deadline for submission of any new military indictments.
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4. 1 .2 Military Factionalism: Irreconcilable Differences?
Unfortunately for Alfonsm, Punto Final backfired dealing the civilian government
a harsh blow. Constrained by a 60 day time period, civilians rushed to the courts to file
law-suits against as many officers as possible. In the span of those two months, 400
officers were indicted. This occurrence exacerbated the military's fears that it would be
decimated. Therefore, unlike the Brazilian military, clear-cut factions that had been
dividing the armed forces since the time of the Proceso became extreme. Mid to lower
officers who were most implicated in the human rights violations felt abandoned by the
senior command which appeared more concerned with keeping the military unified. 14 The
senior leadership realized that there were few solutions for the trial dilemma. A concerted
military coup would have had little if any civilian support, thus further discrediting an
already vilified institution in the public s eye. Moreover, the senior commanders, like most
Argentines, considered the Proceso enough meddling in civilian affairs. They wanted to
put it behind them so as to repair the wounds within their institution.
Without active senior support, many of the accused mid-level officers instead
sought leadership in the fundamentalist faction of the armed forces. The fundamentalists
viewed the world as a battle between good and evil, where the threat of subversion was
omnipresent. Their mission was the restore a messianic-like "Truth." The fundamentalist
leaders, Lt. Col. Aldo Rico and Col. Muhamed Seineldin, desired a stronger military voice
in Argentina's foreign policy. 15 They yearned for a tutelary role where the armed forces
would be actively involved in government initiative. Nevertheless, most of the officers that
sought refuge amongst the fundamentalists upon passage of the Punto Final law did not
accept the group's dogma, but felt that it was the only voice of support and defense
available within the armed forces "family." 16
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4. 1 .2. 1 The Fundamentahst/Carapmtada Rebellions: Enter Bargaining
The fundamentalist faction eventually mutinied during Holy Week of 1987 The
senior leadership, many of whom agreed with the basic principle of the rebellion-
termination of human rights accusations-did not participate, but resisted putting down the
mutiny. Unlike the coup of 1976, the mutineers had no intention of overthrowing
government, particularly since they would have had no public support and most likely no
institutional backing from the armed forces as a whole. Instead theirs was a forceful show
of solidarity among officers who felt they were being deprived of recognition for their valor
during what they perceived as a just war. Rebellion leader, Lt. Col. Aldo Rico stated "To
all Argentines of good faith: Do not be fooled, this is not a coup, it is an internal Armed
Forces problem. 17 Yet, it was a "problem" that very much was related to the civilian
government.
Despite massive civilian public demonstrations against the uprising, Alfonsm
appears to have bargained with the military. Soon after the incident, Congress passed the
"Due Obedience Law" which granted judicial immunity to nearly all mid-level officers.
Patrice McSherry, echoing the sentiment of many Argentines at the time, notes that
Alfonsm may not have needed to accede to military demands. 18 However, Alfonsfn's
rationale may have been two-fold. First, he had never wanted to try the lower echelons of
the military and second: if he refused to cooperate with the armed forces at that juncture,
they would remain a thorn in his side and divert his attention away from equally, if not
more, pressing issues such as the economy which during the Easter Week rebellion was
undergoing a series of "draconian" shocks. 19
As was the case for the civilians with the trials of the officers, once Alfonsm began
the bargaining process it was difficult to control the pent-up demands on the part of the
fundamentalist faction. Between 1987 and 1988 two more uprisings occurred, yet only the
latter was of any real consequence. With passage of the National Defense Law in 1988, the
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military s internal security role was, for the most part, officially eliminated. This only
exacerbated fundamentalist antagonism. As a result, in Dec. of 1988, the largest of the
three mutinies erupted that had as goals the pardon of all imprisoned Proceso participants,
higher salaries, and the expulsion of numerous senior officers. Once again Alfonsfn
negotiated with the armed forces. Shortly, thereafter they received a salary increase and the
Army Chief of Staff was removed.
To understand why Alfonsfn seemed to so easily accede to military demands one
needs to examine the greater socio-political and economic picture in 1988. Inflation was
nearing 400% a year and early political polls predicted a Peronist party victory in the 1989
presidential elections. Both of these factors, combined with the fact that theirs was the first
democratically-elected government in years, led to a "sense of desperation" within
Alfonsfn's Radical party and in the nation as a whole.20 With the government under
mounting pressure to resolve the nation's problems, the rebellious faction added to the
chaos, yet it was also the easiest problem to deal with. With a few concessions, Alfonsfn
resolved one dilemma and could move onto the next. Of course, it is important to note that
even though the overburdened Alfonsfn conceded to most of the military requests, he did
not agree to the mutineers' central demand: full pardons for all Proceso officers.
4. 1.2.2 "Catch-22"
The bitter irony of the human rights trials and the resultant rebellions was that had
there been no wave of indictments of junior officers, the Argentine armed forces would
most likely have accommodated themselves to obeying constitutional authorities. The
senior leadership, and the majority of the officer corps, unlike the fundamentalist faction,
was more interested in mending the divisions of its Proceso past than in contesting civilian
prerogatives. This understanding was succinctly reflected in the comments of one
Argentine officer in 1985:
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The armed forces [should stick to] an ascetic, integrated professionalism [tol their
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tasks ‘"^ The armed forces should not govern; [they] can't govern-[they] don t know how to govern.. ..As many times as they have tried, the military
always ends up losing the most. When [the armed forces] dedicate themselves totheir professional tasks, [they] don t have time for other things
.
21
Besides not being able to govern, the Malvinas debacle demonstrated to the world that the
Argentine military was not even capable of winning a conventional war; the basic puipose
of any armed forces. The military command felt their institution needed to re-focus on that
essential mission. The resignation brought on by this realization explains, in part, why the
armed forces accepted drastic cuts in their size and budget without much complaint. Alfred
Stepan elaborates;
Empirically such an absence of military contestation would be most likely to occur
within the overall context of a sociopolitical situation that approximates the
"restoration” path of redemocratization. In such a path the military might accept a
reduction of their prerogatives without contestation if such a pattern of low
prerogatives were seen as an integral part, by both the military and the civilian
leaders, of the overall model of governance and of civil-military relations that is
being restored
.
22
Yet, Alfonsm was incapable of maintaining that sense of shared purpose that Stepan alludes
to. The president's respect for the separation of powers between the executive and the
judiciary restricted his control of the course of "redemocratization." Allowing the human
rights trials to multiply, against his personal judgment, he (as the embodiment of civilian
society) attacked a "high prerogative" area of the military. The trials, in combination with
constant verbal assaults in the media and on the streets, led the military to close in upon
itself; to prepare for what many within the institution perceived as their "last stand."
Ultimately, Alfonsfn's sense of being a democratic pioneer would cost him his
presidency. He had refused to intervene in the proceedings of the judiciary until it was too
late. Wendy Hunter, in an analysis that seems particularly apropos, has paralleled civil-
military relations in Argentina with the international relations model of the "chicken game."
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Extrapolating Hunter's model, one concludes that had Alfonsfn pre-empted the civilian
judicial onslaught by limiting the trials to just the military junta initially, he may never have
needed to accommodate the military ("to swerve"). In not doing so he was eventually
forced to bargain with the military. Yet the military itself "swerved" in this scenario
because the uprisings tore away at its foundation of discipline and hierarchy and threatened
its future as an integrated institution.23 Nevertheless, in the face of a broken economy and
with little national respect, Alfonsfn resigned in 1989 and opened the door for the election
of a Peronist, Carlos Saul Menem.
4.2 The Presidency of Carlos Saul Menem: Prioritizing Accomplishments
Carlos Menem was elected in a period of incredible uncertainty. The economy was
plummeting, the military was challenging civilian directives, and with the end of the Cold
War, a "new world order" was on the horizon. Menem interpreted most of the problems he
inherited from Alfonsfn as a product of indecision and lack of strong leadership. 24
Menem's particular conception of power was steeped in a corporatist mentality that required
near absolute centralized control. He viewed the Argentine presidency as a vehicle to move
the nation forward, however not necessarily towards greater democracy. His personal,
almost authoritarian leadership, would not have been possible in 1983, yet by the late
1 980's and early 90's national instability was so severe that drastic measures were called
for. The problem for Argentina, however, is that the crisis of the early 90's has since
disappeared, yet Menem's authoritarianism continues.
4.2.1 Menem's Political Identity: Keys to the Kingdom
For any analysis of truly contemporary civil-military relations in Argentina, one
must first understand the political psyche of Carlos Menem. Unlike the Brazilian
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experience, he has been his nation's only post-Cold War president. For that reason alone
he would warrant a deeper discussion. Yet, Menem is more noteworthy not for his
endurance in the executive, rather for how he has maintained that power. Once this
becomes clear, one will be able to see the rationale for his dealings with the military.
Numerous Argentine scholars have noted that Menem represents an eccentric mix of
the old and the new in politics. He displays strong populist tendencies, derived from his
Peronist party background, while at the same time he promotes neo-liberal ideology. He
has become a world ''player” in terms of international politics and business, yet displays
some of the most conservative tendencies traditionally associated with the "backwoods"
provinces of Argentina. If one were to label Menem, perhaps the best description would be
that coined by Atilio Boron who referred to the president as a "neo-conservative." 25
Menem's "neo-conservatism" may appear internally contradictory, yet there is a
strong central belief that undergirds Menemista politics: personalism and a Thomistic/
corporatist philosophy. Upon close examination, Menem appears to have transplanted
many of the traits of the traditional regional caudillo (rural landed patriarchs who controlled
political and economic life in most of Latin America) to the national level. Boron outlines
the president's understanding of politics and his role vis-a-vis society in three levels:
1.Society is a natural organism where all the parts must co-habitate in harmony. If
not there will be anarchy.
2.Social conflict is merely an expression of personal interests clashing. There are
no 'structural contradictions' or 'unresolvable antagonisms.'
3.No solution is possible without approval of the center. 26
This tripartite model has fit neatly into the uncertainty of a post-Cold War Argentina, with
the levels building upon themselves.
Like the caudillo who resolved any problem in his province personally, Menem
has taken it upon himself to solve the issues of the military, the economy, and social
unrest. He has bypassed the institutional support that is available to him through his party
(which currently holds a majority in congress) and defied the authority of the legal system
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to "go it alone." Apparently feeling that the world had drastically changed since Alfonsin
assumed the presidency in 1983, Menem chose to accommodate the transforming reality.
Rather than abiding by notions of democracy which were not ingrained in Argentine
society- and which seemed, to Menem at least, to have brought about Alfonsin's downfall-
-Menem sought instead to apply his own brand of politics to the chaotic world of the
immediate post-Cold War. As international relations theorist David Campbell describes,
the political vacuum of the time allowed for such an approach. Campbell writes:
The nexus between the moment of these events and the power of this mode of
analysis is to be found in the contention that we live in a distinctive political time
marked by the absence of a corresponding political space; that is to say, the activity
of politics is no longer (assuming it once was) concomitant with the enclosure of
politics (the state). Indeed, these changes and our ability to comprehend them isboth made possible by, and helps constitute, the political contours of the late-
modern period; contours that might be characterized in terms of the globalization of
contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political
discourse. ...This globalization of contingency, this irruption of contingency not
only renders problematic the traditional spatializations of power (e.g. states,
alliances, political parties), it renders problematic the discursive practices which
have made those spatializations of power possible. 27
Menem has ruled largely by decree which is compatible with his notion of society as having
no "unresolvable antagonisms." The president feels that only he, as the center of national
political life mandated by the electorate, can solve any problem. This sentiment is only
deepened with greater strides toward complete neo-liberalism. The "downsizing" of the
state and the lack of a doctrine of government arbitration make him appear to be "the" axis
upon which political society resolves. 28 Finally, like the caudillo, maintenance of his
personalistic rule requires doling out of privileges; in other words, clientelism. He is
known as a "good payer of political favors;" a reputation that has become evident in his
interaction with the armed forces. 29
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4.2.2 Menem: Personality v. Institution
Menem has effectively silenced the military issue in Argentina, yet his methods for
doing so may leave an unwanted legacy. He has not only bargained for political "space,”
as Alfonsin reluctantly was forced to do in the end of his regime, he has, in effect
consolidated the military around him as an individual rather than around the office of the
president. His example of decree rule, along with his concessions to the armed forces,
cannot in any way serve as a model for democratic professionalism (obedience to
democracy and civilian authority) among the men in arms.
The military, both its leadership and the fundamentalist faction, looked to Menem in
1989 as the resolver of their long-standing complaint regarding human rights trials, yet for
different reasons. The senior leadership wanted the issue settled hoping that the
fundamentalists (also known as carapintadas), who had been tearing the institution apart,
would then fade from prominence. The command corps realized that the rebellious officers
resented any senior efforts of accommodation on the issue of the trials. That resentment
translated into a serious discipline problem as the natural order of the military hierarchy was
threatened. Meanwhile, the leaders of the fundamentalist faction expected the resolution of
the trial dilemma to be a first step toward a greater voice in government, in other words,
active tutelage.
4.2.2. 1 Military Amnesty
The carapintadas sought to gain Menem's favor by making it known that they
would "defend his victory with arms." How much this threat helped Menem's campaign is
questionable, however it may have instilled fear in the Radical party congressmen who
would have to deal with Menem as president (much like Franco's Real plan executive-
military alliance in Brazil).
30 As a consequence of this military backing and a reflection of
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the president s personalist approach, Menem, soon after his election, issued two sweeping
pardons of nearly all the Proceso officers, imprisoned or under indictment. What Alfonsm
had feared doing because of both a respect for democracy and of possible electoral
repercussions, Menem quickly dealt with.
The rationale for Menem s pardons is clearly understood using Boron's tripartite
model. First, Menem viewed society as a natural organism. In this organism all the
entities must co-habitate, yet within their individual spheres. The military, both in the
Proceso and during its various mutinies had overstepped its "place" in society. It had tried
to effect civilian policy. On the other hand, civilians had overextended their bounds in
hunting the armed forces through the civil judiciary.
Second: Menem felt that he could resolve any social problem because all problems
resulted from confusion and were not representative of a structural defect (there could be no
structural defect because society was an "organism"). Therefore, he did not view his
pardon as a symptom of continued military dominance, rather (in simplistic terms) he saw it
as a solution to a misunderstanding. Menem, like the Hobbesian Leviathan, was looking
out for the greater good of the whole; in this case Argentina.
Third: No solution would be possible without Menem's involvement. Parties and
the other institutions of democracy had failed during Alfonsfn's tenure to resolve the
lingering military problem. Menem's intervention, more importantly than resolving the
issue, affirmed his "essentiality" in Argentine politics. Like the caudillo's ranch where no
decision could be made without the caudillo's cognizance, Argentina was Menem's
"ranch." Menem would take credit for a grand accomplishment on the part of the military,
yet he was also prepared to bear the brunt of civilian hostility. Regardless, in Menem's
understanding both sides' reactions would serve the same purpose: they would re-affirm
his preeminence in Argentina's existence, casting an imposing shadow on the congress,
parties, and the judiciary.
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Beyond all the machinations of the Menem political psyche, the president was
afforded political maneuverability in issuing the military amnesty because of the sentiment
of the nation in 1989-1990. A 1990 national opinion poll found that 70.6% of the
population of greater Buenos Aires disapproved of the pardons, yet the survey also
highlighted Argentine s more immediate concerns. With inflation skyrocketing— 1800% for
1990 and national un- and underemployment at an unprecedented 16% 3 '-the military was
low on the list of people's priorities (table 4.1).
Table 4.1
Question: Which of the following problems do you consider most grave 9
December 1990-Federal Capitol and Greater Buenos Aires
Capitol Greater Buenos Aires
% %
Low salaries 27.6 26.8
Military issue 00.5 03.3
Administrative corruption 21.6 18.0
Foreign debt 05.0 02.5
Education 13.0 10.0
Inflation 04.0 10.3
Bankruptcy 03.8 09.0
Human Rights 02.5 01.5
Unemployment 14.3 10.3
Drugs 04.3 07.5
Health 03.5 01.0
Total 100 100
Source: Rosendo Fraga, Menem y la cuestion militar, (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Union para la
Nueva Mayoria, 1991), p.149.
Once the pardons were issued, military contention was muted. Fundamentalist
leaders such as Lt. Col. Aldo Rico and Col. Muhamed Seineldfn had hoped to build a
political movement within the military upon the general amnesty, however both were soon
disappointed. As the senior military leadership had been aware of for years, the
carapintadas' real cohesion had resided in the fear of imprisonment for what they felt was a
just war; not in any nationalistic/tutelary political ideology. Emblematic of this sentiment,
interviews conducted by Samuel Fitch in 1985 and again in 1992 of over 100 Argentine
officers found that none favored the "guardian of national security/tutelary model."
Furthermore, only 1% in 1985 supported a "conditional subordination model," with that
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figure dwindling to 0% in 1992.“ One officer, in a 1992 interview, rejected the potential
for future military intervention in Argentina with a reference to the complexity of the new
"globalized" world:
This is not the role of the armed forces, not in Argentina. [These are] different
situations, different levels of culture, different transitions, and different political
olitiS ”
6 Ar
^
ent 'ne military has 136611 burned; they want nothing to do with
The officers may feel that they want nothing to do with politics, but Menem has made them
very much a part of his political agenda.
4.2.2.2 The Military: Vehicle for Menem's Political Identity
Concurrent with his neo-liberal economic philosophy, Menem has reduced the size,
budget, and holdings of the armed forces. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament statistics
calculated a decline in the military budget from 3.9% of the Argentine GDP in 1989 to
1.9% of GDP in 1991. 34 Menem has also eliminated the national conscription system and
sold much of the military's property using the money to off-set military debt and to
modernize a stream-lined armed forces. Such presidential moves, particularly the
elimination of the draft, would appear to threaten traditional military prerogatives. Yet, a
1992 poll indicated that only 4% of Argentine officers viewed Menem negatively, in stark
contrast to the 88% disapproval rating that Alfonsfn mustered during his term. 35 What
explains this great disproportion? The explanation lies in Menem's political philosophy,
much of which is based on a system of bargains (favors with the implicit understanding
that loyalty is required).
Considering himself the axis upon which Argentine society revolves, Menem has
pursued a series of negotiations with the armed forces that have, in the words of Patrice
McSherry created a "guardian democracy via executive-military alliance." Unlike the
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Brazilian situation with its still cohesive and respected military, most Argentines do not
view the armed forces positively. 36 New revelations recently about the "dirty war,"
saturating the media on a daily basis, have done nothing to ameliorate that situation. 37
Moreover, most scholars agree that the Argentine armed forces, once the issue of human
rights trials was over, purged itself of most, if not all, its fundamentalist/interventionist
faction. In such a national context and with such an internal institutional mentality it would
seem highly unlikely that any coup, whether a concerted effort or a "wildcat-type" affair
would have any chance of success.38 As Paul Zagorski notes:
Risk-benefit analysis has clearly swung against intervention. Today if the armed
forces disagree with the government on policy, those disagreements do not entail
the survival of the armed forces as an institution. Nothing on the horizon has the
salience for the military that the rights issue did. Nothing is likely to induce the
same degree of unity of military opinion. Nor is any other issue liable to evoke a
similar willingness among officers to risk their careers and undermine military
obedience. Military unrest may have compelled the government to back down on
the rights trials, but it was also a wrenching experience for the armed forces
themselves. Few officers seem willing to repeat it.39
As proof of this analysis, a 1990 rebellion by fundamentalist officers who wanted a greater
say in government policy was quickly crushed by the military itself.
Contrary to Brazil, even contention on budgetary issues is low-key. The military in
Brazil adapted to an interest-group existence because it could still appeal to the public as a
symbol of order and relative purity. However, the Argentine armed forces do not have that
option. With no desire of intervention and with little public appeal, the armed forces appear
to have very little leverage with which to bargain with civil society. Yet, Menem has
pursued a series of acts that have on the one hand cushioned the budget cuts and more
ominously, on the other hand, centralized greater power under the president.
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4.2.3 Negotiating a Civil-Military "Intimacy"
The political world according to Menem has walked a fine line between democracy
and authoritarianism. Much of Menem's actions in the executive, such as his hundreds of
decrees, have clearly violated democratic norms. His interaction with the military has only
added to the sense of authoritarianism. On a pure level of appearances, Menem has taken
nearly every opportunity to both socialize with and praise the military establishment. He
has gone so far as regarding the dirty war (a period during which he spent 5 years as a
political prisoner) a valiant and noble endeavor. Whereas Alfonsfn was seen as the alien
enforcer of civilian mandates, Menem's social approach has opened very basic avenues of
civil-military communication. This new intimacy has been formalized with numerous civil-
military deals and manipulations that cast even greater doubt on the future of democracy in
Argentina.
4.2.3. 1 Internal Intelligence
Menem's efforts in the area of internal intelligence have been particularly troubling
in the context of a nation that still mourns the deaths of thousands labeled as subversives.
The issue of national intelligence is one of distinct resonance in all nations with
authoritarian histories. In Brazil, President Collor's disbandment of the military-run SNI
appeared to release society from one more bond of military repression. Of course, as has
been shown, the shuffling of armed forces personnel neutralized much of the effect of that
political move. In Argentina, with its much more violent past, President Alfonsfn
eliminated the remnants of military presence in the Secretariat of State Intelligence
(Secretarfa de Inteligencfa de Estado-SIDE) by replacing all of the military personnel with
civilians. Menem, however, has reversed that decision and has once again appointed
military personnel to many posts within SIDE. This remilitarization has not been restricted
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to the lower-levels of the internal security community. Menem also appointed a retired
army colonel to the position of Subsecretary of the Interior40 and a retired Navy officer as
second in command at SIDE.41
4. 2. 3.2 Internal Security
The increased military presence in SIDE has been paralleled by a re-introduction of
an internal security role for the armed forces which began soon after Menem's
inauguration. Facing incredible hyperinflation and civil unrest, particularly in the form of
looting, Menem issued Decree #392 which authorized a military combat role to suppress
what the order ambiguously termed "internal commotion." 42 Reflective of the trepidation
still associated with any hint of a military return to domestic vigilance, members of both the
Peronist and Radical parties vehemently criticized this move.
In the wake of the terrorist bombing of the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association in
July of 1994, Menem once again decreed a greater domestic function for the military. His
creation of the Secretariat of Security and Protection of the Community, or the
Supersecretaria as it is more widely known, incorporated both civilian and military
intelligence, despite legal restrictions on internal intelligence by the military. Although
formally a body for the combat of international terrorism, the Supersecretaria'
s
activities,
Patrice McSherry notes, in reality, "have been directed toward worker protest and other
domestic conflicts." 43 Moreover, the head of the Supersecretaria is a former Air Force
officer and on its payroll there are numerous retired Proceso officers. Yet, the vital feature
of the Supersecretaria is that it was created by Menem, without congressional approval,
and is solely under his personal authority.
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4. 2. 3. 3 Manipulating the Budget
Numerous scholars have concluded that the military in nations such as Argentina or
Brazil no longer are factors in politics because of decreased budgetary outlays.44 However,
as the Brazilian case highlighted, official budget numbers can be a deceptive indicator of the
civil-military balance. Menem has shown that he is well aware of that phenomenon and has
manipulated the national appropriations in line with the military's renewed internal role.
The military budget shrunk from 3.9% of GDP in 1989 when Menem was inaugurated to
1 .9% of GDP in 1992, during a period of impressive growth in domestic output making
the military's appropriation smaller than the statistics bear out. 45 Like Collor in Brazil who
maintained a "secret budget," Menem has compensated for the military financial shortfall by
increasing the security community's outlays over the objections of the congress. In 1992
SIDE received (U.S.)$1 15 million and in the difficult economic time of 1995 that figure
had risen to (U.S.)$250 million; 30% more than authorized by the legislature. By contrast,
the highest allocation to SIDE during Alfonsm's tenure was (U.S.)$54.5 million in 1989.46
4.2.4 "Unequal Civilian Accommodation"
While Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco both looked to the military as a national
ally in dealing with a fractious party structure in the legislature, Menem's rationale for
appealing to the armed forces cannot be based upon the same institutional weaknesses.
Argentina has long had a history of strong party identification, rather than the self-
interested, rational choice system Wendy Hunter describes Brazilian parties as.
Furthermore, Menem's party currently holds a majority in the congress. Instead Menem's
negotiations with the military draw upon his political thought. He did not merely re-
introduce the military to an internal security function, he did so making sure it was under
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his direct control. Menem now had the physical power to mediate social
misunderstandings" so as to return Argentine society to its state of "harmony."
Of course, the great dilemma for Argentina is the future of Menemista policies vis-
a-vis the armed forces. Menem’s caudillo
-like approach to democracy plays into the mind-
set of many within military. Atilio Boron's tripartite model outlining Menemista thought
emphasizes the piesident s Aristotelian understanding of democracy. Menem, unlike his
predecessor Alfonsm, appears to believe in a definition of democracy very similar to the
one proffered by Argentine Colonel Hugo Pascarelli in justifying the "dirty war."
Pascarelli believed that "democracy, true democracy, was based on natural law and order;
egalitarianism debased democracy, for it leveled society and ignored the natural differences
between human beings." 47 Accordingly, Menem, through decree rule, has stunted any
movement toward a democratic professional military model where both democracy and
civilian authority are respected equally. At best, the Argentine armed forces can be said to
represent a classical professionalist framework where civilian leadership is obeyed, yet
democracy has little authority. More disturbing, however, is the potential for the armed
forces to assume a "praetorian guard" nature around the individual figure of Menem.
Alfred Stepan, writing in 1988, forewarned of the dangers of such an occurrence:
Another vulnerability of the 'unequal civilian accommodation' position is that a
polity could become transformed into a nondemocratic civilian-headed garrison state
because of exploitation by the executive of the prerogatives the military retained in
the system. An additional basic weakness of this position is that the lack of regime
autonomy from the military implied in such high military prerogatives could
delegitimize the new democracy in the eyes of civilian and even political society.48
The long-term consequences of this "unequal civilian accommodation" remain to be seen.
4.3 Conclusion
Both Raul Alfonsm and Carlos Menem, regardless of their contrasting definitions
of leadership or democracy, shared a commonality: they both bargained with the armed
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forces. Alfonsm attempted to avoid such a scenario, yet he was a victim of his nation's
history. His was a time of revolution; an imprisoned people had overthrown their captors
and now demanded retribution. Alfonsm learned the difficult lesson that in periods of
revolution traditional concepts may become too inflexible to deal with the changing reality.
Alfonsm pledged faithfulness to a lofty goal of democratic respect for the separation of
powers and for the will of the people, yet even in what is considered the "model for the
world's democracies," the United States, that obedience is at times sacrificed when there is
a call for strong leadership (Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and FDR in WWII to
cite just two examples).
Carlos Menem learned from Alfonsm s weaknesses and has slowly erased much of
Argentina's international pariah status through his aggressive neo-liberal project. Under
Menem, Argentina entered the MERCOSUL trade bloc and has posted decent economic
figures, although there have been periodic shocks. Nevertheless, one must ask at what
cost this success came at. His sweeping amnesty for the Proceso officers nullified the
Argentine judiciary's authority and his extensive rule by decree, rather than through the
congress, has done little for solidifying concepts of "checks and balances." Moreover, by
reestablishing an internal role for his armed forces, which were much more weak and
vulnerable than their Brazilian military counterparts, Menem has sacrificed a golden
opportunity to establish, perhaps permanently, a model of democratic professionalism
within the armed forces. Instead, his belief in delegative democracy or "getting the job
done," has resulted in an unsettling centralization of power. In terms of civil-military
relations, this has resulted in, to use the McSherry term once again, a "guardian
democracy" where the memory of authoritarianism lingers on.
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CHAPTER 5
EPILOGUE
Civil-military relations in Latin America in 1996 remain enigmatic. In the late
1970's civilian governments were the exception, today they are the norm. Based upon this
observation, one would conclude that the military in Latin America has distanced itself from
internal politics. However, as Machiavelli reminds us, appearances need not reflect reality.
Chile, an apparently thriving civilian state, still has not completely emerged from the
shadow of General Pinochet. In Peru, the military actively supported President Fujimori as
he abandoned any shred of fidelity to democratic institutions with his auto-golpe.
Venezuela, a nation with a long twentieth-century history of military non-involvement,
experienced various military coup attempts in the 1990's as it descended into its current
state of financial crisis. In Mexico, the ruling PRI has come to rely extensively on the
military in the mid-1990's to crush popular resistance in Chiapas. Meanwhile Brazil and
Argentina, as this study has demonstrated, continue to struggle with the vestiges of military
authoritarianism.
As Jose Alvaro Moises noted, democracy is not necessarily a natural result of the
end of authoritarianism; it requires a concerted effort by civilian protagonists, the military
and the populace. 1 This study, more importantly than its exhibition of contemporary civil-
military relations, casts doubt as to the dedication of Brazilian and Argentine civilian leaders
to pursuing democracy . The degree of that commitment will, ultimately, determine the
future of civil-military dialogue and, as a result, the future of government in those two
South American states. Will Brazilian and Argentine leaders rely on formal democratic
norms regardless of the policy costs or instead resort to political "arm-wrestling" with the
legislature, using the military as muscle (with unpredictable consequences)? For now, the
answer seems to favor the latter. All of the post-authoritarian presidents of Brazil have
bargained with the armed forces for political advantages within their nation's democratic
framework. As for Argentina, Carlos Menem has taken civil-military negotiation to a new
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level by not only compromising with the military but actually reversing legal limitations to
internal military involvement. These actions call into question the viability of the liberal-
democratic paradigm in the southern cone of the Americas.
The post-authoritarian presidents of Brazil and Argentina (particularly Franco and
Menem) have demonstrated that democracy is valuable as an abstract concept, yet the
achievement of political results may outweigh its worth in practice. These leaders appear to
believe, as Adam Przeworksi noted, that authoritarianism (read: result-oriented gov't) and
democracy (read: representational government) may be interchangeable within the same
regime. Przeworski wrote. There exist combinations where the threat of repression is
sufficient to counterbalance the weakness of representational government." 2 Francisco
Weffort added, in what can be applied to both the Argentine and Brazilian cases, that "[i]n
the Brazilian political tradition, the idea that democracy is only one possible instrument of
power among many, only a means, is so deeply rooted that it is difficult for us to conceive
of democracy as an end in itself." 3
In Argentina Raul Alfonsfn assumed the presidency prioritizing democracy. Facing
multiplying demands for justice in the form of military trials, Alfonsfn's commitment to
democracy (the will of the people) soon proved antithetical to the requirements of his office:
determined leadership necessary in a period of transition. The trials exposed Alfonsfn as
indecisive and diverted his attention from the nation's most pressing issue, the economy.
As an old Brazilian proverb reminds us, "voting doesn't fill your stomach."
Carlos Saul Menem opted for stronger leadership, reflected from the very beginning
with his relation to the military. Menem's organicist/corporatist vision allowed him to
concede on the issue of the military trials and focus on the nation's economy where he has
had mixed success. Menem's authoritarian style has been criticized in various quarters,
both nationally and internationally, yet in the most relevant arena-the electorate-he was
favored with re-election in 1995 and is rumored to be seeking a third term.
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In Brazil, democratic institutional weaknesses threatened to result in legislative
chaos and gridlock. Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso
have all, in one way or another, bypassed those flaws by directly negotiating with the
armed forces. The results of such questionable deals have been the implementation of the
neo-liberal Real program, which has lifted Brazil from the abyss of inflation, as well as the
compensation plan for those named in the nation's "disappeared" list. Both of these events
mark memorable political success stories; not much of an incentive for fidelity to
constitutional channels.
There are, of course, inherent risks to executive-military bargaining and alliance-
making. The fact that the president, be he Argentine or Brazilian, deems it vital for his
interpretation of the national good that a particular bill be passed or decree enforced over
the objections of the congress and the courts-with the armed forces' backing-merely
transfers the Thomistic apology for authoritarianism from the armed forces to the executive.
Like the military of the 1 960’s and 70's, the president may feel that he alone knows what is
best for the nation as a whole, regardless of the constitutional rights of the elected
legislature or the judiciary. By forging alliances with the military, the executive not only
perpetuates an active internal role for the armed forces, he also shows by his example that
democracy is not necessarily a priority and that there are always those individuals who need
not abide by constitutional constraints. In such a context, it may be challenging for a
Brazilian or Argentine officer to rationalize his own obedience to constitutional limits on his
historical power. If, for example, the global economy plummeted and the nation was in
upheaval, why should this officer refrain from exercising his traditional poder moderador ?
On the other extreme, executive-military bargaining also has the potential to bolster
military fidelity, yet, not to the office of the president, but rather to the individual in the
executive at the time. A financially needy armed forces may cling to a leader who finds
more effective ways to ameliorate their plight. Such a personalistic allegiance, as the
Menem presidency illustrates, creates the potential for civilian-led authoritarianism and sets
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a troubling standard for future presidents to meet. Should Menem's successor decide to
once again curtail military prerogatives, how will the armed forces react? Their response,
as the Brazilian case noted, may not necessarily result in a military overthrow of
government, but at the very least could divert executive attention from other areas of
concern. Presidential policy could, thus, be hampered resulting in uncertain electoral
ramifications for the executive and his party.
In the decade or so since government was returned to civilians in Argentina and
Brazil, a plethora of scholarly articles and books have been published dealing with political
transition and consolidation of democracy. If this thesis has been at all successful, it will
hopefully have shown that consolidation in Brazil and Argentina remains incomplete. As
Lawrence Graham noted:
[pjolitical analysts often use the criterion of two successive transfers of power from
one civilian president to the next as sufficient to establish a consolidated democracy,
but such an assessment overlooks the problem of institutions and the power of
traditional elites to limit democratization
.
4
Until Brazilian and Argentine institutions are sufficiently strengthened to confront both the
after-effects of their authoritarian pasts as well as the distinct problems of emerging
industrialized powers (economics, global markets, jobs, pollution, crime, drugs, etc.),
executive-military bargaining for political reality seems inevitable.
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